



Research Article

# MONTEJURRA AND THE GUARDIA CIVIL. STATE OF THE QUESTION AND GENEALOGY OF SOME ACCUSATIONS

*English translation with AI assistance (DeepL)*

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Received 12/07/2025

Accepted 19/11/2025

Published 30/01/2025

doi: <https://doi.org/10.64217/logosguardiacivil.v4i1.8345>

Recommended citation: Echevarría, J. J. (2026). Montejurra and the Guardia Civil. State of the question and genealogy of some accusations. *Revista Logos Guardia Civil*, 4(1), 83-104. <https://doi.org/10.64217/logosguardiacivil.v4i1.8345>

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Legal Deposit: M-3619-2023

NIPO online: 126-23-019-8

ISSN online: 2952-394X



## **MONTEJURRA AND THE GUARDIA CIVIL. STATE OF THE QUESTION AND GENEALOGY OF SOME ACCUSATIONS.**

**Summary:** INTRODUCTION. 2. THE APATHY OF THE GUARDIA CIVIL 3. THE ACCUSATIONS OF THE MONTEJURRA REPORT 4. THE INQUILPATION OF SÁENZ DE SANTA MARÍA 5. EVALUATION OF THE BIBLIOGRAPHY 6. CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS. 8. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES.

**Abstract:** This article determines the state of play regarding the accusations against the Guardia Civil for the events that occurred at Montejurra in 1976, which resulted in two deaths during the traditional Carlist pilgrimage held since 1939 at the so-called sacred mountain of this political and social movement, which is already nearly two centuries old. It also elaborates on the genealogy of these accusations, analyzing their development over the almost five decades that have passed, with the aim of serving as a reference for the academic studies that will likely be conducted between now and next year, the fiftieth anniversary of the Via Crucis. Beyond the reproaches for the restraint of the policeman present at the time in the face of the violence that occurred, the main accusation stems from the statements made by General Sáenz de Santa María, who was Chief of Staff of the Guardia Civil when the tragic events occurred.

**Resumen:** Este artículo determina el estado de la cuestión respecto a las acusaciones contra la Guardia Civil por los hechos ocurridos en Montejurra en el año 1976, que se saldaron con dos muertos, en el curso de la tradicional romería carlista que desde 1939 se celebra en la considerada *montaña sagrada* de tal movimiento político y social, que cuenta ya con una antigüedad cercana a los dos siglos. Asimismo, elabora la genealogía de tales inculpaciones, analizando su desarrollo a lo largo de las casi cinco décadas transcurridas, con el objetivo de servir de referencia a los estudios académicos que previsiblemente se harán de aquí al próximo año, cuando se cumpla el quincuagésimo aniversario del viacrucis. Más allá de los reproches por la inhibición de los agentes entonces allí presentes ante la violencia habida, la principal acusación obedece a lo sostenido por el general Sáenz de Santa María, quien fue el jefe del Estado Mayor de la Guardia Civil cuando ocurrieron los trágicos hechos.

**Keywords:** Carlism, Traditionalism, Guardia Civil.

**Palabras clave:** Carlismo, Tradicionalismo, Guardia Civil.

## ABBREVIATIONS

CT: Traditionalist Communion

ETA: Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, Basque Country and Freedom

HOAC: Hermandad Obrera de Acción Católica (Catholic Action Workers' Brotherhood)

PC: Carlist Party

PCE: Communist Party of Spain

UNE: Spanish National Union

## INTRODUCTION

The lethal consequences of what happened on 9 May 1976 in Montejurra are well known: two people, Aniano Jiménez Santos, a 40-year-old anti-Franco militant and member of the Hermandad Obrera de Acción Católica (HOAC), and Ricardo García Pellejero, a 20-year-old worker with no known political affiliation, were killed by gunshot wounds. From this point on, there is disagreement about everything else, especially about the causes of such violence and about the support received by those fighting, although some even deny the fact that one of the two antagonistic parties fought. The obscurity about what happened even goes so far that it has not been possible to specify other basic details of any report, such as the exact number of wounded, around twenty, three of whom were also shot.

It is not the purpose of this article to attempt to resolve these unknowns. It is only to specify how the media and bibliography have understood the work carried out by the Guardia Civil, deployed days before on the *sacred mountain*, establishing a genealogy about it, in which the statements of the then Colonel José Antonio Sáenz de Santa María occupy a prominent place.

As a preliminary step, it is necessary to introduce Carlism and its three ideological principles: fundamentalism, traditionalism and legitimism, focusing on the divisions within it. If legitimism was born in 1833 with the death of Ferdinand VII, when the dynastic quarrel began between the two opposing Bourbon branches, traditionalism originated in the *Manifesto of the Persians* in 1814, the calling card of a moderate reformism, as opposed to the pretensions of the *apostolic* fundamentalists, whose most virulent expression would not arrive until 1827 with the revolt against the king of the *Malcontents* (Lluis y Navas, 1827). (Lluis and Navas, 1967) Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, the followers of these three principles would engage in internal divisions and disputes, often accompanied by violence, especially when defeat once again followed the Carlist fortunes. This was the case at the end of the Seven Years' War (1833-1840), when the traditionalists (*Marotists*) shot six *apostolics* in Estella, (Ferrer, 1957, p. 18) and when the fundamentalists assassinated the legitimist Carlos de España; (Ferrer, 1958, pp. 65-69) and after the Four Years' War (1872-1876), when the fundamentalists split, coming to blows with the legitimists in the Olimpo theatre in Barcelona (Canal, 2000, p. 23). (Canal, 2000, p. 231) After the Civil War (1936-1939), despite being the only occasion on which the Carlist forces won an armed conflict, Carlism was dismantled by the new military regime led by Franco, preventing it from capitalising on this victory and, ultimately, *losing the peace*. (Brioso, 2001) Carlist discouragement led to a violent incident in Pamplona in 1945, with one person shot and wounded in a clash between *Carloctavists* (traditionalists who collaborated with Franco) and the legitimists who were anti-Franco. (Villanueva, 1997) In 1957, in the Hotel Menfis in Madrid, the police had to intervene in a fight between *Javierists* and *Juanist Carlists*, the latter supporters of Juan de Borbón, to whom they attributed legitimate Carlist rights, despite the fact that, as the son of Alfonso XIII, he belonged to the *reviled* rival Bourbon branch that had embraced liberalism, the secular Carlist enemy. The *Juanist Carlists*, two years later, would go to Estoril to recognise him as the legitimate Carlist king, and from then on they would be known as *Estorilos*. (Vázquez de Prada, 2006) In 1957, José María Valiente, head of the Secretariat appointed by Javier de Borbón Parma to lead Carlism, had suffered a serious attack in Madrid at the hands of an intransigent anti-Francoist (*sivattista*), who hit him twice on the head with an iron truncheon, due to his collaborationist policy with

Francoism, with which the *javierismo* intended to opt in the race that was then beginning to succeed Franco as Head of State. (Martorell, 2014, p. 114) In 1958, in the Monastery of Irache, at the foot of Montejurra, three *Estoril* leaders were shaken and beaten at the hands of *Xavierists*. (Lavardín, 1976, pp. 58 and 68) A year later, in Montejurra, Mauricio de Sivatte, who had just made official his dissidence from *Xavierism*, was beaten. (Vázquez de Prada, 2011) In 1968, Roberto Bayod Payarés, leader of the *Crusaders*, was assaulted in Estella by *Javierist* legitimists, and there were also incidents on the esplanade of the Irache Monastery with the display of pistols. (García Riol, 2015, pp. 120-122) All this shows the secular level of violent confrontation within Carlism, with respect to its dissidences.

In 1969, when Franco appointed Juan Carlos de Borbón as his successor, the *Xavierists* began a process of ideological renewal sponsored by the dynastic authority of the Bourbon Parma family and based on the legitimist principle, which led them to embrace a self-managed socialism within a few years, founding the Carlist Party (PC) and abandoning the secular denomination of Traditionalist Communion (CT) (Caspistegui, 1997, pp. 217-227), while at the same time abandoning the traditionalist communion (CT) (Caspistegui, 1997, pp. 217-227). (García Riol, 2015, pp. 94-117) In 1975, Javier abdicated his rights in favour of his first-born son Carlos Hugo. Months earlier, the CP had joined the Democratic Junta in opposition to Franco's regime, together with the Communist Party of Spain (PCE), (Brioso, 2001) taking the disagreement between the regime and the Bourbon Parma family to the highest levels, but such animosity had been palpable since 1968, when the members of the dynasty were expelled from Spain. Franco's animosity towards the Borbón Parma was much earlier, as shown by the banishment of Fal Conde, the deputy head of the TC, in 1937. In 1964, Franco summoned several ministers, among them Manuel Fraga, then head of Information and Tourism, to order them to keep an eye on Carlos Hugo, telling them regarding the succession race: "This gentleman is going nowhere... I beg you to take note, and each one in his own sector to do everything possible to clear it up" (Fraga, 1980, p. 1). (Fraga, 1980, p. 125).

The organisation of the Montejurra event, the most important of all the annual Carlist events, was the responsibility of the Brotherhood of Voluntary Knights of the Cross, formed by requetés from the Civil War, with the usual presence at the pilgrimage of *javieristas*, *carloctavistas*, *estorilos*, *sivattistas* and *cruzadistas*; in other words, of all Carlist sensibilities, whether legitimists, traditionalists or fundamentalists. From 1954, the year in which a new Way of the Cross with crosses and stone bases was inaugurated, leaving behind its local component and acquiring a national dimension with pilgrims from all over Spain, (Santa Cruz, 1988, pp. 93-95) and especially from 1958, a year after Carlos Hugo presented himself at the summit as Prince of Asturias, the rally reached enormous levels of attendance, with 98,000 people in the last year mentioned (Vázquez de Prada, 2016, p. 85). In 1964, there were still 70,000 attendees. This number began to fall substantially in the following years, coinciding with the growing *Jacobite* control of the Brotherhood, formally through the Carlist Regional Council of Navarre. In this process, the religious and commemorative act in remembrance of the fallen took on an intensely political hue. In 1976, relegating the Navarrese junta, the event was organised directly by an Organising Commission of Euskadi, controlled exclusively by the *Carlo-Huguenos*, who collected economic funds and designed the service of order, as well as the banners and flags (Caspistegui, 1997, pp. 290-295), inviting all the participants to attend. 290-

295), inviting around ten anti-Francoist political formations, including the politico-military Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), which was to send its representatives, as Carlos Carnicero, then federal secretary of the CP, revealed in a personal communication with the undersigned in an interview held in Madrid on 10 February 2025.

On 9 May 1976, five months after the death of the dictator and the proclamation of Juan Carlos I as king, the event organised by the *Carlohuguinos* was held, which was attended by only 5,000 people (Caspistegui, 1997, p. 314). Of these, some 600 responded to the call of the most traditionalist and fundamentalist sector of the *Xavierists*, under the leadership of Sixtus Henry of Bourbon Parma, who had proclaimed himself the Standard Bearer of Tradition in the face of the *betrayal* of his older brother Charles Hugo, grouped under a reborn TC (Martorell, 2023). (Martorell, 2023) Here, for numerical purposes only, we should count the *Crusaders*, who were also present, as well as the still existing *Sivattists* (Senent, 2004, p. 172). The *Sistines* had planned their presence as an *Operation Reconquest* of Montejurra, which would wrest the *sacred mountain* from the *Carlo-Huguenots*. Apart from them, there were dozens of *Storilian* traditionalists, including well-known personalities who held important posts in the regime, grouped in the Spanish National Union (UNE), one of the legal political associations created in the late Francoist period, such as Juan María de Araluce, president of the Provincial Council of Guipúzcoa and member of the Council of the Kingdom, who would be assassinated by ETA, who unfoundedly accused him of being a *Sistine*. Also from the UNE and the Council of the Kingdom, but now closer to the standard-bearer Sixto Enrique than to King Juan Carlos, was Antonio María de Oriol, president of the Council of State, a member of a renowned *Estoril* family, who abandoned the cause of the *Juan Carlos* dynasty after the first measures of the new monarch (Echevarría, 2024, pp. 25, 36-37 and 514-515). Also belonging to the UNE was the *Sixtine* Ramón Merino López, also present in the mountains. It was no coincidence that the UNE had been forged in homage to Ramiro de Maeztu, the driving force behind the journal *Acción Española*, conceived in the 1930s as an umbrella organisation for the monarchist followers of the two dynasties and the driving force behind the ideological renewal of the right in a concept of neo-traditionalism (González Cuevas, 1998, p. 67). (González Cuevas, 1998, p. 67).

## 2. THE APATHY OF GUARDIA CIVIL

The *Carlohuguina* commission that had organised the Montejurra event had requested authorisation for the customary pilgrimage from the Civil Government of Navarre. It was, therefore, an event known to the regime, which also had detailed information on the implications it entailed, as reflected in a note from the General Security Brigade of the police on 8 May, which stated:

The Carlist Party has planned the appropriate measures to energetically repress any attempt to sabotage events by the supporters of D. Sixto Enrique de Borbón Parma, who according to the Carlists, aided by the authorities, will appear in Montejurra accompanied by a *large number of gunmen and official guerrillas* to prevent or sabotage the said event. (...) In subsequent press conferences, the regime would be held responsible (...) for any bloody events that might take place this year in (...) Montejurra. (Caspistegui, 1997, p. 347).

The newspapers insisted that the Guardia Civil acted that day with "exquisite impartiality", (Zuloaga and Zuloaga, 1976) as the *Voz de España* pointed out, "helping to

separate the rival groups", (Uranga, 1976a) as the *Diario de Navarra* and *Unidad* said. (Zuloaga, 1976) *El Pensamiento Navarro* insisted on the "passive attitude", despite the fact that "the presence of the Guardia Civil was numerous", (Indave, 1976a) with two helicopters to visually control the area, although limited, especially at the summit, because the weather conditions that day were not optimal: fog and chirimiri as recalled by *El Diario Vasco*, who pointed out that "the supporters of Mr. Carlos Hugo and Mr. Sixto clashed". (Peña, 1976) The fact of the existence of two sides and the "confrontation" had even been announced by the journalist Fernando Ónega in *La Voz de España* on 9 May, (Ónega, 1976a) in an article prior to the event, which *Arriba* distributed among the newspapers of the Movement. (Ónega, 1976b) But, once the events had taken place, *El País* was undoubtedly the most explicit newspaper in this regard, stating on the front page: "A hundred years on, history has repeated itself once again. Two Carlist factions confront the brothers Carlos Hugo and Sixto Enrique de Borbón y Parma". (Cebrián, 1976a) The *Diario de Barcelona* also emphasised this: "The multiple splits that Carlism has recorded in its (...) history are polarised today into a (...) socialist and self-managing faction and another that adopts ultramontane and fundamentalist methods. Two irreconcilable ways of understanding an ideology". (Pernau, 1976a) The Minister of the Interior himself, Manuel Fraga, attributed the events in Montejurra to a fight between brothers, (Canal, 2000, p. 385) which was soon repudiated by Jordi Solé Tura in *Mundo diario*: "It is not, then, a question of two factions violently confronting each other, but of a crowd of people who want to peacefully and orderly demonstrate their democratic aspirations and an armed gang that provokes and attacks" (Solé, 1976). (Solé, 1976) It was also *El País* which, in its editorial, demanded accountability:

How is it possible that the Civil Government of Pamplona (...) allowed (...) the existence of a large armed group at the top of the mountain all weekend? (...) It is incomprehensible that fifty people with machine guns were on the mountain (...) and the Government did not know about it. (...) We request that the Government clarify the circumstances (...): who and how many made up the armed bands that took the summit, whether the supporters of both Carlist groups fired or only those of one (...); the reasons why (...) no arrests were made. (Cebrián, 1976b)

Other newspapers, such as *La Voz de España*, (Zuloaga and Zuloaga, 1976) *El Pensamiento Navarro* (Indave, 1976b) and *Diario de Navarra*, which recalled that it had warned days earlier of the "painful consequences" of "the bloody reconquest of Montejurra", also called for responsibility. (Uranga, 1976b) Also the magazines, such as *Gaceta Ilustrada*: "the reasons why the Guardia Civil failed to respond to the bloody events cannot be explained" (Gómez Mardones, 1976b). (Gómez Mardones, 1976) *Cuadernos para el diálogo* expressed its surprise that the shooters were not arrested, asking "who armed them? (Altares, 1976) Likewise, *Triunfo* (Elordi, 1976a), which recounted what happened at the summit of Montejurra: "Eight or nine pistol shots. A short burst from a machine gun (...) There are four wounded by gunshot, one practically dead [Pellejero], shot in the chest, very close to the heart". (Elordi, 1976b)

Obviously, the CP also demanded responsibility. That same day, after coming down from the unfinished Stations of the Cross, its secretary general, José María de Zavala, belittled the *Sistines*, attacking the *Storilians*, and charged against Juan Carlos I, whom he considered the true rival of Carlos Hugo and the instigator of what happened at

Montejurra: "There has been Carlist blood shed (...) [by] those who say they are defending Tradition, (...) Religion, and it turns out that they are those who are on the side of the capitalist oligarchy that always fought against Carlism, the liberal capitalist monarchy". (Uranga, 1976c)

The *Carlo-Hugueno* strategy was therefore to involve the rival monarchy, either through the Arias government, of which Fraga was vice-president, or through the UNE *stalwarts* present in Montejurra, bypassing *the Sistines*. The CP resorted to the press through the procurator Gabriel de Zubiaga Imaz. In statements to Tele/eXpres, Zubiaga, who had been present at the 1976 Montejurra, claimed that the government "knew that something strange was being prepared" and wondered what various leaders of the UNE were doing in Montejurra, such as Araluce and José Luis Zamanillo (Angulo, 1976), a historic member of the secular TC, national delegate of the Requetés during the war, but who had abandoned the *Javierista* discipline and gone over to the *Estorilos*. These statements were the genealogical starting point for the accusations we are analysing. They were collected for the first time historiographically in a book entitled *Montejurra 76*, published that same year, whose authors were Josep Carles Clemente Balaguer and the *Diario de Barcelona* photographer Carles Sánchez Costa, author of the visual snapshots of what happened. The journalist and historian Clemente formed part of the small group of leaders close to Carlos Hugo - the *clique*, as his opponents denounced it - and was responsible for the historiographical renovation of Carlism, which consisted of presenting this movement as socialist from its origins, disregarding its traditionalist and fundamentalist principles; historiography that has been called *neo-Carlist*. This first approach to the events of Montejurra fully admitted the existence of two opposing sides in the events that took place near the Monastery of Irache, where Aniano Jiménez was badly wounded, although it insisted on the fact that the Guardia Civil had not made any arrests that same day. According to Sánchez, "the Carlists raised the famous thick sticks, which are sold for the Stations of the Cross. The *Sistines* took out (...) their truncheons', getting into a fistfight:

The first blood warmed others, on both sides. (...) From my right I saw the man who turned out to be Don Aniano Giménez [Jiménez] Santos come out, launched. He was carrying a club and was heading for the *Sistine Chapel*. He was cut down on the way by a bullet (...). Almost a minute before the shot, I saw the man *in the trench coat* say something to the *man in the trench coat*. Aniano Giménez [Jiménez] doubled over (...). From the second line, the Carlists attempted a charge with batons that was halted by the pistol still displayed by the *man in the trench coat*. They opted to address the guards, who had already left the *jeep*. I heard a young man say to them: "Why don't you intervene? Can't you see there are guys with guns. The lance corporal made up his mind. At the risk of his life, he stepped into the line of fire, raising his arms, one of which held his regulation submachine gun. *Don't shoot*," I heard him say. He immediately ordered his numbers to stand in the middle, with their weapons pointing in the direction of where the shot was fired (...) Finally, without any arrest being made, the group of aggressors also fled. (Clemente and Sanchez, 1976, pp. 109-111).

The *jeep* was manned by four guards and the *man in the trench coat* was José Luis Marín García-Verde, who was arrested by the Guardia Civil on 15 May and brought before the judge in Estella, who ordered his imprisonment. (Pernau, 1976b) Marín García-

Verde was a retired commander, had been a requeté in the Civil War, provincial chief of the Requetés in Huelva until 1965 and was a member of a reputed Carlist family with prominent leaders in the secular TC. (AGUN, *Manuel Fal Conde Fund*).

The CP maintained a triple line of action: on the one hand, the more political, led by the procurator Zubiaga who presented an interpellation to the government in the Cortes on 26 May; (Miralles, 2023, p. 548) on the other, the more judicial, through the filing of a lawsuit by the victims' families on 31 May, (Caspistegui, 1997, p. 348) led by the Carlist lawyers, who were the first to file a complaint against the government in the Cortes on 26 May (Miralles, 2023, p. 548). 348) led by the *Carlo-Huguin* lawyers Juan Francisco Martín de Aguilera and José Ángel Pérez-Nievas; (Clemente, 1992, pp. 983-988) and finally, he commissioned a group of twelve Carlist and other anti-Franco activists present in Montejurra on 9 May to investigate what had happened with the intention of providing information to the other two parties and also to the press. (Purroy, 1976) All of them supervised the actions of the Guardia Civil in Montejurra.

Zubiaga's interpellation was made public on 10 January 1977, after months of delays by the Cortes presided over by Torcuato Fernández-Miranda, the *Juancarlista* mastermind of the transition to democracy. The ombudsman put eleven questions to the Arias Navarro government, vice-presided by Fraga, which were not answered (Montoliú, 1977). Among them, according to the *Official Gazette of the Cortes Generales* of 23 June 1976:

If since the foundation of the Brotherhood (...) there have always been strong contingents of Guardia Civil, all along the route (...) and at the top of the mountain, what special reasons of government have there been this year, so that, for the first time, no more than the esplanade of Irache [where the monastery] has been covered by the Guardia Civil, when there were more numbers than other years and they were reinforced by a large number of Armed Police.

Montejurra was a confrontation between Carlists, as a member of the Government has said, tell us what role Mr Juan María Araluce (...) and Mr Antonio María de Oriol played there".

Coinciding with the dissemination in the press of the content of Zubia's interpellation, as did *Triunfo* (Salabert, 1977) and *El País* (Montoliú, 1977), journalistic investigations into the events at Montejurra appeared in the media, fed by information provided by the team that had organised the CP. Thus, the weekly *Opinión* focused its attention on the financing of *Operation Reconquista*, pointing the finger at the UNE and mentioning various current accounts of Antonio María de Oriol and Juan María Araluce - assassinated by ETA four months earlier, He accused them of being "politically" behind what had happened, without failing to mention Fraga, whom he claimed "had reached an agreement to protect Operation Reconquista, but withdrew in the end in view of the turn the events were taking due to the low turnout of *reconquistadores*" in the *Sistine Chapel*. The events were attended by Italian fascists, with the weekly citing Augusto Cauchi and Stefano delle Chiaie. With regard to the Guardia Civil, it recalled what happened in the vicinity of the Irache Monastery: "a Guardia Civil checkpoint under the command of a corporal from Azagra [a Navarrese town in the Merindad of Estella] did not intervene in support of the ultra attack, which led publications such as *Brújula* and *Fuerza Nueva* to speak of *treason*". Before the shooting of Aniano Jiménez, the Carlist Etelvina Lamana called on the Guardia Civil to intervene against the *Sixtinos*. A guard replied: "As long as they don't shoot...". It also explained the inhibition of the Guardia Civil, a conversation between the civil governor, José Luis Ruiz de Gordoa and Fernández de la Mora, president of the UNE, in which the former reportedly assured the latter: "There will be no problems, the Guardia Civil has orders not to intervene". The weekly newspaper limited the functions of this security force to protecting Sixto Enrique and preventing buses and cars without the *Sistine* emblem from reaching the Ayegui and Irache fields with the aim of reducing the *Carlo-Huguenot* presence at the pilgrimage. However, "the Carlists [Carlo-Huguenos], in the end, were able to pass in their coaches along uncontrolled roads, and the truth is that the Guardia Civil, faced with the massive influx, did not intervene in favour of either side". (Landaburu, 1977)

*Cambio 16* devoted two reports, in which it took aim at Antonio María de Oriol and his brother Lucas María, based on "sources close to the Carlist Party": "The Oriols were in charge of preparing Sixto's public presentation in Spain". "The Oriols were ideologically in line with the Juanist [Estoril] line of Carlism", collaborating "closely with the regime" of Franco, it added. "Years later, in 1972, they felt the desire to connect with Sixto Enrique de Borbón Parma, through the split to the right of the Carlist Party, which took place that same year, led by (...) José Arturo Márquez de Prado, considered Sixto's right-hand man in Spain", the weekly added, explaining why an *Estoril* family from 1959, when such a Carlist current was formed, should now embrace the *Sistine* cause. Furthermore, the accusation against the UNE was extended to another of its members, the *Sistine* Eugenio Mazón Verdejo, Secretary General of the Post Office, whom the weekly reported had gone to Fraga's office on 6 May, assuring him that they would take more than 5,000 troops to Montejurra. According to the journalistic account, Fraga "promised them that he would place the forces of the Guardia Civil on the esplanade, with the order that no one without the corresponding badge would pass" (Oneto, 1977a). (Oneto, 1977a)

The certainty that in Montejurra there would be a powerful mass of Sixto supporters, (...) capable of making fools of the Carlist party militants, was one of the guarantees requested by the Ministry of the Interior to lend its support. The aim was to discredit Carlism and leave the followers of Carlos Hugo in a situation of defeat. (Oneto, 1977b).

*Cambio 16* also focused attention on another member of the UNE, the *Sistina* Ramón Merino, in whose name the Civil Government of Navarre reserved 20 rooms in the Hotel Irache. (Oneto, 1977a) For the weekly, "while Merino was in charge of coordinating the high politics of the operation, José Arturo Márquez de Prado (...) prepared the raw part of the set-up (recruiting people and organising the shock forces)" (Oneto, 1977b). (Oneto, 1977b)

### 3. THE ACCUSATIONS IN THE MONTEJURRA REPORT

Coinciding with the press offensive, the Carlist lawyers of the relatives also lodged an appeal against the conclusion of the judicial investigation into the events of Montejurra 76, which had been handed down by the 21st Court of Instruction in Madrid, which had inherited the case from the Public Order Court, which in turn had received it from the judge in Estella (Cebrián, 1977). (Cebrián, 1977) In this appeal, the lawyers Martín de Aguilera and Pérez-Nievas described the violent events that had occurred in the vicinity of the Monastery of Irache and on the summit of Montejurra, explaining the former as an attack by the *Sistines*, accompanied by fascists, against the "pilgrims. The obvious purpose of all of them was to evict the pilgrims (...), in order to then take possession of the Way of the Cross". Regarding the latter, the appeal recalled that the *Sistines* had made themselves strong there since the previous night, firing on the pilgrims (Clemente, 1992, p. 984-985). In both events, José Arturo Márquez de Prado, Sixto Enrique's lieutenant and former national delegate of Requetés *javierista*, had played a prominent role. Pepe Arturo, as he was known, gave an interview on 8 September 2009 to Margarita Suárez de Lezo, of the TC, in which he admitted having been at the summit, leading the *Sistines* present, but denied that he had ordered the shooting of the *Carloshuguinos*. He also acknowledges having met with General Ángel Campano, then director general of the Guardia Civil (Suárez de Lezo, 2009). Pepe Arturo, together with Marín García-Verde, and Francisco Carreras Mouríño, were in prison while the case was being processed, leaving prison before the end of 1976 (Oneto, 1977b). In the new complaint, Oriol and Araluce were no longer linked to the events, although Merino was, although it was noted that "the presumed responsibility of the main leaders of the political association UNE has not been investigated". "Nor (...) [that] of certain authorities, especially the then Minister of the Interior Manuel Fraga, the director general of Guardia Civil, General Campano and the civil governors of Navarre [Ruiz de Gordo] and Logroño", added the appeal against the closure of the investigation (Cebrián, 1977). Merino, according to Miguel Ayuso Torres, who would become head of Sixto's Political Secretariat, in an interview with the author of this communication, held on 7 July 2025, was a man who trusted Pepe Arturo and, like him, a member of the new TC, as well as the founder of the local Madrid section of the UNE.

With regard to Araluce, ETA had included in its November *Zutik* the denunciation of procurator Zubiaga to *Tele/eXpres* and the accusation that the president of the Diputación de Guipúzcoa had "subsidised Roberto Pallals [sic, Roberto Bayod Payarés],

a leading member of the Cristo Rey guerrillas [in reality, a leader of the Carlist Association of Voluntary Crusaders], with a cheque for 6 million', implicating him in a corruption offence with Telefónica, which was proved to be false (Echevarría, 2024). (Echevarría, 2024, pp. 92-95) However, this accusation persisted in the work done by the Carlist investigation team, which had supplied information to the media, and which published its results on the first anniversary of the events of Montejurra, in a bookshop in Bayonne (France). *Informe Montejurra 76*, better known as the *Black Book* because of the colour of its cover, was distributed clandestinely in Spain from May 1977 onwards. The authors were also anonymous (Purroy, 1977).

The *Black Book* again accused UNE leaders Oriol and Araluce, accusing them of having financed *Operation Reconquista*, although Juan María Araluce was systematically referred to as José María (Echevarría, 2024, pp. 92-94). On the other hand, it limited itself to pointing out that the rooms in the Hotel Irache were reserved in his name (Anonymous, 1976, pp. 28 and 41). 28 and 41) Regarding Fraga, *Informe Montejurra 76* considered that the then Minister of the Interior, accompanied by General Campano, had held a traditionalist summit at his official office at Easter Week, in the presence of Sixto Enrique and two members of the UNE (Oriol and Zamanillo), to discuss the tactical aspects of *Operation Reconquista*. And a fortnight before 9 May, another at "the Las Begoñadas estate" [sic, actually in the Soria town of Las Derroñadas, on a property belonging to the García-Verde family; in another error in the *Black Book*], which Pepe Arturo had already attended, but only Zamanillo for the UNE attended. The interest in involving the political association led the *Carlohuguino* pamphlet to highlight the propaganda work of the leader of the UNE, the *Juanista* Fernández de la Mora, who in the previous days had given a rally in Pamplona "creating an *atmosphere* to reconquer Montejurra", describing the operation as a "crusade" (Echevarría, 2024, pp. 96-101).

Regarding the Guardia Civil, *Informe Montejurra 76* claimed that on 4 May a Land Rover arrived at the Hotel Irache, from which an MG-42 machine gun was unloaded in the presence of a group of officers. On 8 May, General Campano visited Estella, meeting with Sixto Enrique. On the 9th, the Guardia Civil prevented passengers on unmarked buses from approaching the monastery. At around 10.00 a.m., the *Sistines*, accompanied by fascists, arrive on the esplanade of the monastery from the Hotel Irache. They pounced on the *Carlo-Huguenian* orderly service: "recovered from the first seconds of surprise, the Carlists reacted (...), wielding their mountain batons, looking for a melee. The clash was terrible". Aniano Jiménez, "who had actively participated in the response to the aggression", called Marín García-Verde a "coward", who shot him. The civil guards in the Land Rover "have witnessed all the events unperturbed". The officers "say they can do nothing". "We believe that this unusual attitude is the most irrefutable proof of the orders that the Guardia Civil had received, the clearest proof of the government's complicity in the Sistine manoeuvre", interprets the *Black Book*. "The lance corporal (...) put himself in the middle of the two groups (...), allowing the fascists to leave freely (...) without having identified anyone", it adds. After this, the *Carlohuguinos* went to the Ayegui field, together with those who were there, to begin the ascent to Montejurra. At 11.00 a.m., the head of viacrucis is already at the height of the tenth cross, where the *Sistines* have set up a barrier to prevent access to the nearby summit. At 11.20 a.m., after being met with boos, a proclamation launched from the summit that read: "Attention Carlists, Don Sixto is going to speak to you! Ricardo García Pellejero was mortally wounded and three other people were shot: Bernarda Urra Pagola in the buttock, José Javier Nolasco Echeverría in the foot and Jesús Vera Pardo in the groin.

The *Carlohuguinos* with their suitor give up the attempt to reach the summit, while the *Sistines* have fled along another route, the cannon road with their vehicles and weapons. At 2 p.m., Oriol goes to the Hotel Irache and asks for a telephone to speak to General Campano (Anonymous, 1976, pp. 41-73).

The Amnesty Law of 1977 left all those events without criminal responsibility. The case file, which always remained secret, nearly 2,000 pages, was misplaced in the judicial archives and has not yet appeared. On 5 November 2003, the Audiencia Nacional considered Aniano Jiménez and Ricardo García Pellejero to be victims of terrorism (Pérez-Nievas, 2003).

#### **4. THE INDICTMENT OF SÁENZ DE SANTA MARÍA**

In 1998, the journalist Santiago Belloch, brother of the man who had been Minister of Justice and Interior until recently, published a book entitled *Interior. Los hechos clave de la seguridad del Estado en el último cuarto de siglo*. In it, he dealt with the events of Montejurra, although he counted three deaths and not two, as in reality they had been. For the author, it was "incredible that such a public gathering", with "ultras groups of all kinds and origins", "could have taken place without the knowledge of the Security Forces and the information services of the Presidency of the Government". The journalist obtained the testimony of the former Chief of Staff of the Guardia Civil, the now General José Antonio Sáenz de Santa María (Belloch, 1998, pp. 44-45). Belloch managed to get him to handwrite his statement, the autograph version of which appears as an appendix in the book itself (pp. 671-681).

These are his contributions: of Sixto he says that he was known "for his fascist positions", going on to cite Pepe Arturo and Oriol, and even General Campano as members of the Carlist faction opposed to Carlos Hugo. He argued that all of them maintained "the generic intention of *reconquering Montejurra* and managed to get "the Arias-Fraga government to take into consideration the proposal to organise the operation aimed at this *reconquest*". Sáenz de Santa María therefore maintained that the government had at least considered such an initiative by the TC.

To this end, contacts were established between bodies such as the SECED (Central Documentation Service of the Presidency of the Government), the predecessor of the CESID, the Guardia Civil and the aforementioned leaders of the Carlist Party [in reality, the TC] and the Minister of the Interior himself, whose head was Manuel Fraga.

Beyond the general's obvious lack of knowledge that led him to speak of PC instead of CT, his written words revealed that there had been a series of meetings between the government and its intelligence service and Sixto Enrique's group.

The government, the general continued, commissioned SECED to produce propaganda for the event, which also handed out to sympathisers "batons and cachavos [in the original with the letter b] with the aim, they said, of making it easier for them to climb the hill, but in reality to be used in the planned aggression". As for the financing, Sáenz de Santa María held Oriol exclusively responsible for it. As for the enlistment of fascists, the general attributed it neither to SECED nor to the TC itself, but to ultra-right

groups such as Fuerza Nueva and Guerrilleros de Cristo Rey. He cited "members of the Italian Fascist International" and the Triple A, such as Chiaie, Cauchi, Jean Pierre Cherid and "Rodoldo Almirón, later escort of Mr. Manuel Fraga". For Sáenz de Santa María, this was the "first step in what during the Transition constituted the core of the appearances of the so-called counter-terrorist *dirty war*". "All this network operated in some way supported (...) by the State apparatus in all the actions of the fight against terrorism during the 1970s and 1980s".

The general also included in his brief a subsection entitled "Involvement of the Guardia Civil", in which he indicated that at the time it was led by Lieutenant General Campano and sub-directed by Major General Salvador Bujanda. "Both were members of the Carlist Party, were brothers-in-law and maintained a close friendship with Arturo Márquez de Prado, the main leader of the Carlist Party". Beyond the mistake of confusing PC with CT, Sáenz de Santa María was implicating military personnel in a political affiliation.

This led Mr. Márquez de Prado to spend the preceding days (...) at the Directorate General of the Civil Guard (...) even participating in meetings between the Director [Campano] and his General Staff [led by Sáenz de Santa María] and commanders involved in the organisation of the events.

Pepe Arturo requested radiotelephone transmitters and "machine guns". Here, Sáenz de Santa María claimed credit for preventing it. For the rest, the general was wrong to point out that the two dead fell when the *Carlohuinos* ascending the mountain encountered the *Sistina* barrier in the vicinity of the summit and also when he attributed the death of García Pellejero to Marín García-Verde.

In 2004, a year after Sáenz de Santa María's death, the journalist Diego Carcedo published a biography of him, based on long conversations they had when he was already retired, entitled *Sáenz de Santa María. El general que cambió de bando*. In it, the now lieutenant general limited the funding given by Oriol to "bus hire, the sandwiches and wine they handed out, the banners and a few hundred billy clubs and walking sticks". Regarding the Guardia Civil, Carcedo reproduced what appeared in Belloch's book, although he clarified that Campano and Bujanda "did not belong to the Carlist movement", although "they did act as sympathisers, obviously of the sector headed by Don Sixto". And he offered more revelations:

Campano told me that the plan had the blessings of Arias, Fraga and, naturally, General Juan Valverde, director of CESED [sic, SECED in reality]. He also informed me that some thugs from the international extreme right would come to to, if necessary, take on the dirtiest part of the plan.

In Carcedo's biography, unlike the autograph testimony in Belloch's book, the Guardia Civil did supply the *Sixtines* with radiotelephones, but "provided that they were operated by guards of the transmission service... disguised as requetés; that is, wearing red berets and with Carlist insignia on their lapels". (Carcedo, 2004, pp. 150-165).

## 5. ASSESSMENT OF THE BIBLIOGRAPHY

Josep Carles Clemente, the initiator of *neo-Carlist* historiography, summarises what happened in Montejurra as follows: "Two commandos made up of Spanish and international fascist gunmen (...) shot dead two Carlists", stressing "the impunity with which the murders were carried out and the passivity of the Public Order Forces", quoting Fraga and Campano (Clemente, 1992, p. 536).

Joaquín Cubero Sánchez, another *neo-Carlist* chronicler, argued that such events were part of a long-term strategy, dating from 1964, to eliminate the CP. For the author, the Guardia Civil participated in this approach with the controls it carried out to reduce the number of *Carlo-Huguinos* present and with the orders it received not to intervene in the clashes (Cubero, 1995).

Francisco Javier Caspistegui historiographically introduced the fact of the "palpable confrontation in the broad Carlist bosom (...) in a violent manner, largely due to the rivalry between the two extreme factions of Carlism, but also (...) due to the Government's apathy in the face of the signs that were appearing" (Caspistegui, 1997). (Caspistegui, 1997, p. 348).

The journalist and doctor of history Mariano Sánchez Soler argued that "the entire state apparatus was set in motion to bury the truth", highlighting the role of Fraga, Campano and Oriol, but also, wrongly, that of Araluce (Sánchez, 2010, pp. 31-33).

Historian Jordi Canal highlighted three aspects, without expressly mentioning the Guardia Civil. First, the process of growing confrontation within Carlism. Second, the impunity of the extreme right during the Arias government. And finally, "the high interests of the State in putting an end to any possible hindrance to the consolidation of the monarchy of Juan Carlos I" (Canal, 2000, pp. 3 and 4). (Canal, 2000, pp. 385-386).

For Josep Miralles Climent, the historian who nowadays most widely disseminates the *neo-Carlist* interpretation, there is a clear culprit: the Arias government, "the instigator and direct author of the manoeuvre". "All the data (...) point to certain sectors of the government and the state at the service of the new monarchy imposed by the dictator", citing Fraga, Campano, Oriol and 'José María [sic, Juan María] Araluce'. (Miralles, 2023, pp. 507-513).

The latest monograph published, authored by Juan Carlos Senent Sansegundo, has stressed that there were "two groups, one of aggressors, the other of the attacked", as well as "the inhibition of the police forces and the Guardia Civil" (Senent, 2024, pp. 182-187). (Senent, 2024, pp. 182-187).

## 6. NEW DOCUMENTS (FOR THE MOMENT)

From 9 to 12 January 2023, Manuel Martorell, a journalist and doctor of history with a thesis on the ideological continuity of Carlism, published a series of articles in *Diario de Navarra*, based on new documents that had been provided by the CP. These documents were kept in two blue cardboard folders, very common years ago in any office or private home, which were in the possession of the party.

For Martorell, these documents prove "that Montejurra 76 was a State plan against the Carlist Party", "with Manuel Fraga playing a leading role" and with the collaboration of the UNE of the Oriol brothers and Merino. These documents are, according to Martorell, reports, letters and communications from the Civil Government of Navarre, when it was led by Ruiz de Gordo. (Martorell, 2003a) One of them, which appears with a card from Fraga, reports an "extraordinary order" to the Guardia Civil, warning them of the violence that the CP could cause and urging them to carry out roadblocks two days beforehand (Martorell, 2003b). (Martorell, 2003b) For Ruiz de Gordo, *Operation Reconquista* failed because the *Sistines* did not have the capacity to call out, with only 600 followers in Montejurra. (Martorell, 2003c).

On 9 May, Martorell also published in the press an alleged telephone call from the *Sistina* Merino to Juan Carlos I, made from the Civil Government in Pamplona, on the eve of the Montejurra events. The source used is a posthumous letter from the governor's son, José Miguel, for whom the king "was aware of the whole plot". The letter, like the two folders now in the possession of the CP, came from the governor's son. (Martorell, 2025).

## **7. CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS**

The audit of the Carlist investigative team, which together with the prosecutor Zubiaga was at the origin of the accusations, produced few investigative achievements against the Guardia Civil, apart from their inhibition, qualified by the fact that when fire was opened, there were some officers who risked their lives. However, to its discredit, the Guardia Civil did not make any arrests that day, in strict compliance with orders received from the Navarre Civil Government, which in turn passed on orders from the Ministry of the Interior. He did intervene in roadblocks to stop the influx of *Carlo-Huguenos* and in the use of radio telephones. General Campano's performance was worse for his collaboration with the *Sistines*. The *Carlo-Huguin* investigators, and consequently the press and the *neo-Carlist* bibliography, put the emphasis on the *storilos* and not on the *Sistines*, with the aim of implicating Juan Carlos I and ignoring Sixto Enrique.

The Guardia Civil was at the service of the Government, which did have a purpose, taking advantage of the division and confrontation within Carlism, to discredit the CP and its pretender to the throne, Carlos Hugo de Borbón Parma, and thus help in the consolidation of the newly-established Monarchy of Juan Carlos I. In fact, Fraga, at least, had listened to the initiative of the TC that triggered that tragic Montejurra.

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