Revista Científica del Centro Universitario de la Guardia Civil
Revista Lógos Guardia Civil

Research Article

THE THREE PILLARS OF CITIZEN SECURITY

English translation with AI assistance (DeepL)

Antonio José Leal Bernabeu
Lieutenant Colonel of Guardia Civil
Trainee Researcher at the International Doctoral School of the UNED Doctoral Programme in Law and Social Sciences
aleal33@alumn o.uned.es
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1026-6211

Received 28/09/2025
Accepted 24/10/2025
Published 30/01/2026

doi: https://doi.org/10.64217/logosguardiacivil.v4i1.8569

Recommended citation: Leal, A. J. (2026). The three pillars of citizen security. *Revista Logos Guardia Civil*, 4(1), 139-170.
https://doi.org/10.64217/logosguardiacivil.v4i1.8569

Legal Deposit: M-3619-2023
NIPO online: 126-23-019-8
ISSN online: 2952-394X

https://doi.org/10.64217/logosguardiacivil.v4i1.8569
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1026-6211

THE THREE PILLARS OF CITIZEN SECURITY

Abstract: Citizen security has become a cornerstone for ensuring the full exercise of rights and freedoms in modern societies. However, the definition and scope of this concept have been subject to academic and legal debate due to the diversity of related terms (public security, public order) and the evolution of security policies across different historical contexts (Freixes y Remotti, 1995). This article proposes a theoretical framework that structures citizen security into three essential pillars –prevention, investigation, and communication– supported by mission-oriented leadership as an integrative axis. Through a doctrinal and normative analysis, we explore the foundations of each pillar and their interrelationship. We highlight the importance of proactive crime prevention by reducing target vulnerabilities and offender motivations (Cohen & Felson, 1979), effective investigation to ensure accountability and deterrence, and strategic communication both to engage citizens in security and to manage the subjective perception of insecurity. Likewise, we examine how participative and adaptive leadership within security forces is crucial to implement these pillars in practice. Finally, the implications of this tripartite approach are discussed in comparison with traditional security models, and improvements are proposed for public policies and policing practices aimed at achieving more effective, legitimate, and sustainable citizen security.

Resumen: La seguridad ciudadana se ha consolidado en las últimas décadas como un elemento fundamental para garantizar el pleno ejercicio de los derechos y libertades. Sin embargo, la definición y alcance de este concepto han sido objeto de debate académico y legal debido a la diversidad de términos afines (seguridad pública, orden público) y a la evolución de las políticas de seguridad en distintos contextos históricos (Freixes y Remotti, 1995). Este artículo propone un marco teórico que estructura la seguridad ciudadana en tres pilares esenciales –prevención, investigación y comunicación– sostenidos por un liderazgo orientado a la misión como eje integrador. A través de un análisis doctrinal y normativo, se exploran los fundamentos de cada pilar y su interrelación. Se destaca la importancia de la prevención proactiva del delito mediante la reducción de vulnerabilidades y motivaciones criminales (Cohen & Felson, 1979), la investigación eficaz para asegurar la rendición de cuentas y la disuasión, y la comunicación estratégica tanto para involucrar a la ciudadanía en la seguridad como para gestionar la percepción subjetiva de inseguridad. Asimismo, se examina cómo un liderazgo participativo y adaptativo dentro de las fuerzas de seguridad resulta crucial para articular estos pilares en la práctica. Finalmente, se discuten las implicaciones de este enfoque tripartito en comparación con los modelos tradicionales de seguridad,

https://doi.org/10.64217/logosguardiacivil.v4i1.8569
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1026-6211

proponiendo mejoras en las políticas públicas y prácticas policiales orientadas a una seguridad ciudadana más efectiva, legítima y sostenible.

Keywords: citizen security; crime prevention; criminal investigation; communication and security; police leadership; public security policies.

Palabras clave: seguridad ciudadana; prevención del delito; investigación policial; comunicación y seguridad; liderazgo policial; políticas públicas de seguridad.

ABBREVIATIONS

A: Threat.

OHCHR: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

CDC: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

EC: Spanish Constitution.

UNISDR: United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction.

FCS: Security Forces and Corps.

LO: Organic Law.

OODA: Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (Boyd's decision cycle).

UN: United Nations.

POP: Problem-Oriented Policing.

ROE: Rules of Engagement.

SARA: Scan-Analyse-Respond-Assess (Scan-Analyse-Respond-Assess).

STC/SSTC: Judgment(s) of the Constitutional Court.

ECtHR: European Court of Human Rights.

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme.

V: Vulnerability.

https://doi.org/10.64217/logosguardiacivil.v4i1.8569
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1026-6211

1. INTRODUCTION

In contemporary societies, security - in all its meanings - has become a central concern and a highly valued value for citizens (Beetham, 1991; Garland, 2005). The feeling of peace of mind that comes from living in safety is considered an indispensable condition for the full exercise of fundamental rights and the development of community life. However, the conceptual definition of citizen security and related terms (public safety, public order) has not been peaceful. The legislator has traditionally used these terms imprecisely and interchangeably, which has led to theoretical and practical confusion. This has made it necessary for the Constitutional Court to intervene in order to adapt these concepts to the reality of each moment and to delimit them, especially in relation to the limits derived from Articles 18 and 24 EC and the requirements of legality, proportionality and judicial control in security-related interference (SSTC 33/1982, 117/1984, 123/1984, STC 55/1990, STC 341/1993, STC 66/1995 and STC 172/2020). As Montalvo Abiol (2010) points out, public order is an indeterminate legal principle whose lack of objective definition contrasts with its central role as a guideline for the action of the democratic State. In short, the way we define security conditions the strategies for providing it: a predominantly coercive notion of security will tend towards repressive state responses, while a broader and more inclusive vision will favour preventive and participatory policies (Recasens i Brunet, 2007).

Historically, the primary function of the modern state has been to provide security for its citizens through the monopoly of legitimate violence (Weber, 1919/1946). In the case of Spain, the 1978 Constitution entrusts the Security Forces and Corps with the mission of "protecting the free exercise of rights and liberties and guaranteeing citizen security" (art. 104.1 CE). This mandate reflects the need to balance two public goods: the protection of citizens from threats and the safeguarding of their rights. Traditionally, this balance was articulated under the concept of public order, understood in the classic sense as peace and social tranquillity, frequently maintained through coercive measures. However, with the transition to a democratic rule of law, the paradigm shifted towards conceiving security as a service to citizens (Freixes and Remotti, 1995) rather than a mere instrument of state control. The nineteenth-century liberal state privileged the authority of public power to prevent disorder, while the current social and democratic state conceives of the citizen as a recipient of services (including security in multiple areas: against crime, but also food, labour, environmental security, etc.). Providing public security is based on a social pact whereby individuals cede the private use of force to a common power in exchange for protection (Hobbes, 1651/2008; Weber, 1919/1946). This protection - when it requires police force - is exercised in accordance with the law and under the principles of necessity and proportionality (OHCHR, 1990; Organic Law 2/1986; ECHR, 1995).

As we said, with the rise of the welfare state in the 20th century, the concept of security broadened and diversified: it is no longer limited to the mere containment of crime, but encompasses the prevention of risks of various kinds (social, economic, technological) and the guarantee of conditions for quality of life. In its Preamble, defines citizen security as "the guarantee that the rights and freedoms recognised in democratic constitutions can be freely exercised by citizens" and conceives its protection as a broad activity that includes preventive, coercive and assistance actions by various State bodies. In its explanatory memorandum, the law identifies three essential "mechanisms" of the

rule of law to guarantee security: the prevention of offences, the investigation and punishment of criminal acts, and the provision of protection services (assistance to citizens).

At the same time, globalisation and social change have multiplied the spheres of risk and highlighted the limitations of the state in dealing with them alone. Security is no longer the exclusive monopoly of the state through its police: it requires the coordinated participation of other public and private actors, and even of the citizen himself as an active subject with a growing protagonism.

In the words of Francesc Guillén, we are witnessing the transition from governmental policing to plural security (Guillén Lasierra, 2016). This scenario, together with a certain crisis of legitimacy of institutions, has promoted more participatory security models, in which citizen cooperation, transparency and accountability are essential (Requena Hidalgo, 2016). In short, there is a move towards shared security strategies, in which authorities must be more open and responsive to society. Authors such as Guillén Lasierra (2015) stress that the broadening of the concept of security necessarily includes the subjective and community dimension, forcing institutions to be more transparent and closer. Legitimacy becomes another critical axis: drawing on Requena Hidalgo (2016), we understand that greater police legitimacy fosters citizen collaboration and voluntary compliance with the law. A security model structured on three pillars contributes to this legitimacy in several ways: (a) it shows the population a preventive and proactive face of the police (not only reactive or repressive), improving the image of closeness and service; (b) it increases efficiency in results by not neglecting any stage of the crime cycle, which results in greater confidence in police effectiveness; (c) it promotes constant interaction with the community through communication, humanising the institution and making it more accessible. Legitimacy, in turn, feeds back into the model: with greater trust, people participate more in prevention (for example, by joining local security plans, reporting suspicious situations) and collaborate more in investigations (providing evidence, testimonies).

Gledhill (2013), in analysing "the mismanagement of public safety", criticises how the traditional response of increasing police and tightening laws has proved insufficient in the face of persistently high crime rates and an environment of daily insecurity. Our model responds to this critique by integrating not merely quantitative responses (not just more police) but qualitative ones: better use of information, greater involvement of people and innovative leadership in management.

2. METHODOLOGY

In this evolving context, the aim of this research is to propose and substantiate an integrated model of citizen security articulated around three interdependent pillars: prevention, investigation and communication, underpinned by mission-oriented police leadership. The main idea is that a comprehensive security policy should simultaneously rely on preventing crime from occurring (prevention), reacting effectively when it does occur (investigation and punishment) and involving society in the construction and management of its own security (communication), forming a model of three interdependent pillars that generate a virtuous circle between effectiveness and legitimacy. This virtuous circle would respond to the aspiration of modern community policing and procedural justice policies, offering a framework to operationalise this

https://doi.org/10.64217/logosguardiacivil.v4i1.8569
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1026-6211

integrative vision. On this basis, the central hypothesis guiding this research is that efficiency in the management of citizen security in the 21st century depends on the balanced articulation of these three pillars - prevention, investigation and communication - energised by mission-oriented police leadership.

The study adopts a qualitative approach based on doctrinal, normative and public policy analysis. Starting from the observation that in the Spanish context a de facto model of citizen security is already operating in which communication plays a very relevant role, the work aims to conceptually reconstruct this implicit model, critically evaluate it and provide it with a more consistent theoretical and legal basis.

To this end, firstly, a narrative and selective review of the relevant academic literature on citizen security, police legitimacy and mission-oriented policing models is carried out. Secondly, we analyse the main regulations and jurisprudential developments that shape the framework of citizen security in Spain, as well as strategic documents and guides from national and international organisations linked to security management and risk communication. The geographical scope of reference is fundamentally the Spanish legal system and institutional practice, with comparative support when relevant.

The type of analysis is therefore one of conceptual and legal-political reconstruction, with an evaluative dimension aimed at identifying strengths, weaknesses and potential for improvement of the model currently in place. By way of example, without claiming the systematic rigour of an exhaustive empirical design, nor determining causal inferences, some quantitative data relating to the Torrevieja Company, a unit in which the theoretical model described above was applied during the years 2017 to 2019 through a mission-oriented command and multiple actions aimed at communication with citizens and their participation, are included. These illustrative data show the practical applicability of the model and leave the door open for the proposed framework to serve as a basis for future empirical research and public policy evaluation processes in the area of citizen security.

The COVID-19 pandemic from 2020 onwards introduces an exceptional distortion in the operational context, so to avoid spurious comparisons, the empirical analysis is deliberately limited to the earlier period.

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK. GUIDING PRINCIPLES.

3.1. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES

According to the historical evolution of security described by authors such as Recasens (2002) and Gledhill (2013), in Spain, there was a transition from an abstentionist model (liberal state in the 19th century and first decades of the 20th century, where the state had a limited role in general welfare and focused on basic public order), to an interventionist or social model (welfare state in the second half of the 20th century, with greater state presence in social crime prevention, comprehensive policies, etc.), and, more recently, towards an interventionist or social model (welfare state in the second half of the 20th century, with greater state presence in social crime prevention, comprehensive policies, etc.) and, more recently, towards a participatory or pluralistic model (state shared with civil society and the private sector in the provision of security).

The current model of citizen security must be inscribed within the limits imposed by fundamental rights. In the case of Spain, the rights recognised in the Spanish Constitution of 1978 establish clear boundaries: security measures that restrict freedoms must be provided for by law (principle of legal reservation), be applied in a proportionate manner and be subject to effective judicial control.

Furthermore, as we have seen, the progressive delimitation of the concepts of public order and public security through case law has been decisive in the evolution of the security model.

Early constitutional jurisprudence (SSTC 33/1982, 117/1984 and 123/1984) began to outline the distinction between "public order" and "public security" fundamentally in terms of competence (De la Morena, 1987) rather than on the basis of a closed dogmatic delimitation of their material content. On this basis, the subsequent evolution has been decisive: STC 55/1990, in the interpretation made of it by the doctrine, marks a shift from the conception of public order, associated with coercive control, towards a notion of citizen security understood as a state of tranquillity which enables the exercise of rights and freedoms, sustained by both preventive and repressive measures (STC 55/1990, FJ 5). Within the framework of the control of Organic Law 1/1992, of 21 February 1992, on the Protection of Public Safety (repealed), STC 341/1993 contributed to consolidating this idea by examining public safety as a prerequisite for the effective enjoyment of fundamental rights, refining the regime of interference with personal freedom and the inviolability of the home.

In turn, STC 66/1995 pointed out that the alteration of public order can only be invoked to limit rights when there is a certain danger to persons or property "in *the light of the principles of the social and democratic rule of law enshrined in the Constitution*", ruling that it was not legitimate to interpret public order "*as synonymous with respect for the legal and meta-legal principles and values that are at the basis of social coexistence and are the foundation of social, economic and political order*", i.e., that the exercise of rights cannot be subjected to controls of political opportunity or to judgements based on pre-established canons in a predetermined system of values that cohere the social order at a given moment.

On the other hand, in Gillan & Quinton v. United Kingdom (ECtHR, 2010), the Strasbourg Court concluded that police powers to stop and search without suspicion violated the right to privacy because they lacked clear legal limits and adequate safeguards against arbitrariness. In other words, such powers were not in accordance with the law because they lacked sufficient circumscription and controls.

More recent rulings such as STC 172/2020, in line with the ECtHR's orientation, insist that security measures are only constitutionally legitimate when they are strictly subject to legality, to a judgement of necessity and proportionality and to effective judicial control, with sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness.

These examples illustrate that effectiveness in citizen security, in a participatory model, cannot be achieved at the cost of emptying legal guarantees of content: the model must operate within the rule of law. Any police action - be it preventive, investigative or coercive - must scrupulously respect individual rights, so that the rule of law and the

https://doi.org/10.64217/logosguardiacivil.v4i1.8569
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1026-6211

protection of citizens always go hand in hand, in a way that is transparent to the citizen, who is expected to have a certain degree of participation in his or her own security.

The three pillars fit with the latter model: prevention includes social and community measures (active citizen participation), communication makes explicit the collaboration of various actors, including the citizen himself, and research also draws on external resources (private technology, international cooperation, academic knowledge). In other words, it is an open and multidimensional approach.

In reality, prevention, investigation and communication correspond to classic - but sometimes unbalanced - functions of security forces that have traditionally oscillated between preventive and reactive or repressive models. The proposed model emphasises that all three axes are equally necessary and mutually reinforcing if managed under appropriate leadership.

From the jurisprudential trajectory introduced, the need for an integrated model of security in which prevention, investigation and communication act in a balanced way to protect people without undermining their fundamental rights can be defended in a reconstructive key.

Finally, it is useful to contrast this approach with other current international approaches. Concepts such as human security (UNDP, 1994) promoted by the UN broaden the notion of security to include economic, food, environmental, etc. dimensions, insisting on the centrality of the individual and his or her community in defining what concerns them. In a way, the three pillars encompass this spirit: they are not limited to state coercion, but integrate prevention (which connects with social development), communication (citizen empowerment) and research (institutional and legal strengthening). On the other hand, models such as Problem-Oriented Policing (Goldstein, 1979) complement our vision: such a strategy seeks to identify underlying problems behind repetitive incidents and attack them at their root, which requires prevention (situational solutions), research (analysing patterns and sometimes dismantling networks) and communication (working with the affected community to resolve them). In other words, the prism of the pillars is flexible enough to encompass tried and tested approaches, giving them coherence together.

In summary, it can be seen from the above that effective citizen security requires a comprehensive approach, where police and citizens jointly and actively create the conditions for social peace. The three-pillar model - plus the leadership that articulates them - provides a conceptual route to achieve this, but implies organisational and cultural transformations. The potential benefits of moving in this direction (safer and freer communities, more legitimate and effective institutions, capacity to constantly adapt to change) justify the effort.

3.2. RISK EQUATION AND A×V APPROACH

In citizen security, risk can be operationally formulated as the product of the existing threat and the vulnerability of the exposed community (Risk = Threat × Vulnerability) (United Nations, ISDR/UNISDR, 2004, section 2.1, *Risk formulation*). This formulation, widely used in risk analysis, provides a practical guide for decision-making: if one of the

two magnitudes is high, the risk skyrockets; if we reduce either, the risk drops multiplicatively. Hazard (A) refers to the likelihood of a damaging event - deliberate, accidental or natural - materialising, together with its probability and capacity to cause harm. Vulnerability (V) refers to the degree to which people, assets and systems can be affected by that hazard, due to lack of self-protection.

This framework guides prevention (reducing vulnerabilities through target hardening, environmental design and education), investigation/dissuasion (degrading or neutralising criminal capabilities to reduce the threat) and strategic communication (correcting information asymmetries, training potential victims and stabilising subjective security). Operational example (cyberfraud of the elderly): stable threat (specialised groups) × high vulnerability (digital literacy gap) = high risk. Interventions: (a) investigation and judicial/technological cooperation to disrupt networks (↓A), (b) workshops and micro-content with practical advice (↓V) and (c) public communication of operations and verified alerts to deter and empower (↓V), and deterrent signal to potential offenders (↓A). This approach is consistent with intelligence-led policing and international risk management standards (ISO 31000), because it integrates anticipation (threat analysis), protection (vulnerability reduction) and response (investigation and organisational learning). In addition, it facilitates prioritisation: heat maps combining A and V indicators help decide where and how to allocate resources, maximising the preventive return.

Figure 1.
Operational risk matrix (Threat × Vulnerability).



Source: own elaboration based on UNISDR (2004) for R = A×V; the concrete parameterisation is by the author (red high risk, orange medium risk and green low risk).

https://doi.org/10.64217/logosguardiacivil.v4i1.8569
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1026-6211

Table 1.
Security Intervention Matrix according to Levels of Threat (A) and Vulnerability (V)

	V low	V medium	V high
High A	**Maintain hardening; selective messaging (sensitive audiences).**	**Mixed package: capacity building (↓A) + campaigns and redesign (↓V).**	**Priority 1: comprehensive action (surgical research + intensive communication).**
A medium	**Intermittent surveillance and inspection; basic self-protection.**	**Situational hotspot interventions; civic education.**	**Priority 2: preventive reinforcement and active communication.**
At low	**Monitor; maintain habits.**	**Seasonal education and warnings.**	**Targeted training interventions; neighbourhood networks.**

Source: author's proposal based on UNISDR (2004); concrete parameterisation by the author.

3.3. DISTRIBUTED LEGITIMACY AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE

The legitimacy of security institutions is not an abstract attribute of the "system", but a distributed good that is built or eroded interaction by interaction: each control, each interview, each communiqué and each administrative resolution adds (or subtracts). When citizens perceive that decisions are fair, neutral and respectful, voluntary compliance with the law and co-operation (reporting, testifying, providing information) increases. This is the empirical basis of procedural justice (Tyler, 2006; Skogan, 2006). From a normative perspective, the way in which security institutions exercise their authority is regulated by the principles of necessity, proportionality, legality and accountability (OHCHR, 1990; Organic Law 2/1986; ECHR, 1995; Organic Law 4/2015).

In the field of citizen security, institutional legitimacy depends not only on operational effectiveness, but also on the perception of justice in the daily interactions between authorities and citizens. Procedural justice theory (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003) identifies four fundamental components - voice, neutrality, respect and *trustworthy motives* - which, when applied systematically, increase voluntary cooperation, reduce tension in police contacts and strengthen social trust in institutions.

Table 2
Components of Procedural Justice and their Impact on Cooperation and Legitimacy

Component	In practice	Expected effect
Voice (being heard)	**Listen first; open-ended questions; minimum time for narrative.**	**↑ Cooperation; ↓ Tension.**
Neutrality	**Clear criteria; understandable reasons; consistent decisions.**	**↑ Confidence in impartiality.**
Respect	**Dignified treatment; professional language; consideration of vulnerabilities.**	**↓ Conflicts; ↑ satisfaction.**
Reliable motivations	**Explain public purpose; avoid collection or arbitrary purposes.**	**↑ Legitimacy; ↑ voluntary compliance.**

Source: Adapted from Mazerolle et al. (2013) from Sunshine & Tyler's (2003) four components of procedural justice.

4. OPERATIONAL TOOLS: THE THREE PILLARS OF CITIZEN SECURITY

The operational tools of citizen security, structured around three pillars, are built on the above principles. Each pillar corresponds to an essential and complementary function in contemporary policing. The following develops each of them - prevention, investigation and communication - highlighting their specific contribution and their integration into the model.

4.1. PREVENTION

4.1.1. Crime prevention and proactive risk management

Prevention is the first - and perhaps the most decisive - pillar of a modern public safety strategy. It consists of a set of measures designed to prevent crimes or situations that threaten security from occurring by acting on the causes and risk factors before they materialise. This proactive approach is supported by criminological theories such as Cohen and Felson's (1979) Everyday Activities theory, which postulates that for a crime to occur, a motivated offender, a vulnerable victim or target, and the absence of a capable guardian must converge in time and place. Following this theory, effective crime prevention requires influencing at least one of these elements: reducing the vulnerability of potential victims/targets and/or reducing the motivation of potential offenders, given that the constant physical presence of authorities (gatekeepers) is materially unfeasible at all times and places (Clarke, 1995).

Traditionally, public policy has emphasised the increase of police patrols as the main crime prevention strategy. However, this measure shows limitations in contemporary scenarios where crime is more sophisticated, such as cybercrime or transnational organised crime (Garland, 2005; Zedner, 2009). It is therefore crucial to act

https://doi.org/10.64217/logosguardiacivil.v4i1.8569
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1026-6211

on the other two vertices of the criminological triangle: the victim/target and the offender. In terms of risk management, this means reducing the vulnerability of potential victims/targets and reducing incentives or increasing obstacles for potential offenders. In practice, prevention strategies range from community programmes and educational campaigns to situational interventions in the urban environment (Clarke, 1995; Espasa, 2015). For example, improving lighting and urban design in problem areas makes crime opportunities more difficult (situational prevention), while educating the population in self-protection habits (not exhibiting signs of vulnerability, securing their property, using computer security measures, etc.) decreases the likelihood of victimisation.

The Spanish Constitution allows the safeguarding of citizen security to be achieved through both preventive and repressive techniques, depending on needs (Freixes and Remotti, 1995). Traditionally, situational prevention has focused on making crime physically difficult to commit (e.g. access control, electronic surveillance, safe environmental design) and social prevention, which addresses the root causes of crime (inequality, exclusion, civic education). Both dimensions are necessary and complementary: situational efforts reduce immediate opportunities, while social initiatives aim to reduce the propensity to crime in the long term; however, both focus on the potential perpetrator of crime.

To maintain legitimacy, inspections and preventive controls must be understandable, explainable and respectful (voice/neutrality/respect), so that compliance increases without increasing friction. It is advisable to document the reason for each operation and publish the aggregated results.

A third dimension is added to this traditional formula, with communication as an indirect facilitator of prevention. Firstly, communication reduces the vulnerability of the potential victim by inviting them to become part of the ecosystem of their protection through a conscious, educated and informed attitude. Secondly, it reduces the threat by deterring potential criminals, reducing their appetite for crime through constant communication of police successes and their repercussions (sanctions, remand in custody, convictions, pejorative image of the offender and punishment on the news, etc.). In short, far from conceiving the individual as a passive recipient of security provided by the state, modern policies must promote his or her involvement in self-protection and community security. The aim is to facilitate the armouring of citizens through their own active collaboration, so that they become a fundamental element of prevention where a permanent police presence is unfeasible.

4.1.2. Administrative policing as structural prevention of community safety

In the field of general administrative policing, structural prevention operates through ex ante controls on activities and uses of public space (authorisations, limitations, inspections and sanctions) with express legal authorisation in the regulations on public safety and regional and local government. In Spain, this framework is articulated, among others, by LO 4/2015, on the protection of public safety, and by LO 2/1986, on Security Forces and Corps, whose provisions allow reducing opportunities for uncivic or criminal behaviour and sustaining coexistence through conditions of order, health and safety. From the administrative dogmatic perspective, the police in general fulfil a preventive function

that integrates proportionality, suitability and necessity in the limitation of rights, under judicial and legality control.

The administrative function of the police, therefore, constitutes a fundamental instrument in the configuration of safe environments (LO 4/2015), insofar as it regulates everyday conduct that directly affects coexistence and the perception of public order. In its meaning of surveillance, control and promotion of compliance with non-criminal rules, it fulfils a key preventive function on coexistence (LO 4/2015) and, by extension, on crime. It operates in two complementary dimensions. First, it reduces daily social conflict by offering institutional channels to resolve frictions (noise, rubbish, building works, traffic, occupation of public space), preventing individuals from managing their own disputes, which often degenerates into violence. Second, it keeps the environment tidy according to the logic of "broken windows" (Wilson & Kelling, 1982; Clarke, 1995) and related situational prevention approaches, so that the perception of order and control discourages uncivil behaviour and reduces opportunities for crime.

The role of local and regional police forces in monitoring compliance with municipal ordinances and regional provisions issued for the maintenance of coexistence and the preservation of public spaces is therefore equally important.

The administrative police or administrative surveillance functions include, among others, traffic surveillance and regulation, public safety in its administrative dimension, control of weapons and explosives, environmental protection, health regulations, waste and noise management, public shows and establishments, town planning and commercial activity. These are areas governed by authorisations, inspections, administrative sanctions and reinstatement measures, compliance with which shapes civic attitudes and protects common goods, reinforcing the State's legitimate monopoly to manage conflicts (Organic Law 2/1986; Organic Law 4/2015; González Sandoval, 2013; Granados Becerra, 2018).

From the perspective of the three pillars, administrative policing reduces vulnerability (V) by ordering the space and promoting habits of compliance (situational and social prevention); reduces the threat (A) by increasing institutional presence and the perception of control (dissuasive effect); and strengthens legitimacy through communication of rules, sanctioning transparency and neighbourhood service channels. Where the state's administrative presence is weak or fragmented, neighbourhood and family disputes escalate rapidly.

4.2. INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIME

The second pillar of citizen security is investigation, which corresponds to the reactive function of the system: to clarify the facts after a crime has been committed, identify those responsible and bring them to justice. Although prevention would ideally reduce the incidence of crime, in practice there will always be illegal acts; therefore, a robust investigative capacity is indispensable. Criminal investigation serves several essential purposes. Firstly, it makes it possible to punish offenders through criminal proceedings, giving concrete expression to the rule of law and the idea that crime does not go unpunished, while opening the door to redress for the victim (restoration of the legal good in its social, economic and psychological dimension). Secondly, the prospect of being identified and punished acts as a deterrent to potential offenders, especially if investigative capacity increases the certainty of punishment. Thirdly, the accumulation of

https://doi.org/10.64217/logosguardiacivil.v4i1.8569
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1026-6211

intelligence not only from solved investigations but also from ongoing investigations feeds into future prevention, identifying modus operandi, criminal networks or hotspots.

In Spain, Organic Law 4/2015 places the prosecution of offences at the same level as prevention within the mechanisms guaranteeing citizen security. Traditionally, the Security Forces and Corps have been organised internally by differentiating units according to these functions: citizen security or prevention units (uniformed patrol police) and investigation units (plainclothes units such as judicial police, investigation and information). This functional division responds to the specialisation required in each area. Police investigation involves specific methodologies and skills: crime scene processing, advanced interview and interrogation techniques, analysis of financial information, cooperation with judicial authorities and other security forces, among others. A successful investigation also generates a preventive effect by taking criminals off the streets (incapacitation) and deterring others, showing that crime does not go unpunished, as long as not only the final result of the investigation is communicated but also that of the prosecution. Hence the importance of conceiving prevention, investigation and communication not as watertight compartments, but as complementary pillars of the same security strategy.

Another aspect to highlight is the importance of citizen reporting and community participation in the success of the investigation. The collaboration of witnesses, victims and the community in general in providing information is often vital to solving cases. Studies on police legitimacy have shown that institutional trust increases citizens' willingness to cooperate with investigations (Tyler, 2006; Skogan, 2006), which is evidence of the connection between the pillars: police perceived as legitimate get more help from society in solving crimes. Furthermore, the systematic exploitation of data and intelligence from past investigations allows resources to be directed towards the highest impact targets (Ratcliffe, 2008).

This approach generates a virtuous circle: through communication, the results of investigations are made visible, which fuels prevention by reducing the vulnerability of potential victims and the threat of potential perpetrators (through deterrence), and also strengthens the legitimacy of the FSC. In turn, this increased legitimacy stimulates citizen collaboration and facilitates further investigations. Taken together, this should lead to a reduction in crime (greater objective security) and a greater sense of security (greater subjective security), creating a positive loop that allows more resources to be reallocated to prevention where needed and reinforces the resilience of the security system.

Finally, legitimacy must not be lost sight of, which is why investigations must take into account procedural justice. Obtaining reliable information requires dignified treatment and reliable motivations; informing rights, explaining decisions and returning basic results to victims elevates cooperation and evidentiary quality.

4.3. COMMUNICATION , LEGITIMACY AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

The third pillar of citizen security is communication, an often underestimated but critical component. Unlike prevention and investigation, which operate mainly on objective facts, communication also has an impact on subjective security, i.e. on citizens' perception of trust and peace of mind (Jewkes, 2015). Understood as a strategic, two-way and

continuous process of production, validation and transfer of information, communication plays a compensatory role between objective security (actual threat conditions and response capacities) and subjective security (actors' perceptions and expectations).

First, if empirical indicators place objective risk at low levels (in terms of incidence and severity), institutional silence or late/ambiguous messages generate information asymmetries that the public interprets as concealment or disinterest. This communication gap increases distrust, fuels rumours and activates "availability heuristics" (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), so that isolated events are perceived as a trend. As a side effect, defensive behaviour and demands for controls that are out of proportion to the real danger proliferate, diverting resources and incurring unnecessary "compliance costs". In the logic of risk communication, this configuration - low danger but high social alarm - predisposes to institutional and community overreactions that are difficult to reverse (Covello and Sandman, 2001; Slovic, 1987).

Conversely, when objective risk is high, minimising or triumphalist messages, or even the absence of information, induce a perception of safety that does not correspond to the evidence (Weinstein, 1980; Shepperd, Waters, Weinstein and Klein, 2015). This underestimation of risk, in the face of informational ambiguity and situational uncertainty, delays self-protective behaviours by shifting resources to confirming and seeking information (Lindell & Perry, 2012), discouraging citizen collaboration and favouring decisions aimed at the appearance of control with little real effectiveness, which keeps the population exposed to avoidable harm. In terms of "danger + outrage", this is high danger with low social alarm, a pattern that leads to insufficient response (Covello and Sandman, 2001; Schneier, 2003; Slovic, 1987). Therefore, the operational rule is to calibrate tone, frequency and content to the danger-indignation binomial: explain what is known and what is not, what is being done and what is expected from citizens, accompanying the information with actionable and verifiable guidelines (CDC, 2014).

Communication must therefore align perceptions with data, make uncertainties explicit and modulate expectations to minimise both 'false positives' of alarm and 'false negatives' of complacency (Kahneman, 2011; Sunstein, 2005). In operational terms, this requires perception-reality gap monitoring protocols, audience-segmented messages and feedback loops that adjust intervention in real time (Covello and Sandman, 2001).

Communication also acts as a balancing mechanism between the technical dimension of security and the emotional response of the public. It involves constructing a shared narrative of problems and solutions. By making relevant information transparent (without compromising sensitive operations), it legitimises police action and prevents the proliferation of rumours or biased interpretations of reality. In sum, communicating strategically in security matters strengthens institutional legitimacy and citizen cooperation (Jewkes, 2015; Requena Hidalgo, 2016), while helping to both prevent and solve crimes.

These considerations are linked to a change in the policing model towards proximity and co-management of security. As mentioned by authors such as Guillén Lasierra (2015), broadening the concept of security to include citizen perception forces law enforcement to be more open and responsive. Proactive transparency and accountability become an integral part of policing. Similarly, effective communication can empower citizens as co-responsible actors: informed about threats and how to protect

https://doi.org/10.64217/logosguardiacivil.v4i1.8569
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1026-6211

themselves, and involved in dialogue with the police, citizens are no longer passive subjects but allies in prevention and even investigation (reporting, providing information).

In practice, this has led to initiatives such as community policing units, specialised spokespersons, early warning systems on social networks and security education programmes. The legitimacy resulting from this approach feeds back into the model: with greater social trust, people become more involved in prevention (integrating themselves into local plans, communicating problems) and collaborate more in investigations (providing evidence and testimonies). This virtuous circle is precisely the aspiration of modern community policing and procedural justice policies, and the three-pillar model provides a framework to make it operational.

Another relevant aspect is the need for indicators and incentives aligned with this pillar. If police effectiveness has historically been measured only by crime rates and cases solved, our approach suggests including communication metrics as well: degree of citizen satisfaction with the information provided, response time to neighbourhood requests, number of preventive campaigns carried out, etc. In this way, commanders will be motivated not to neglect the communicative facet, understanding that it has an impact on objective and subjective security.

Finally, emphasising communication and openness can generate internal resistance in organisations accustomed to hermeticism. Managing this cultural change requires leadership (the fourth element) that convinces that transparency, far from jeopardising operations, enhances them in the long run. Tensions may arise in the short term - for example, an initial increase in alarm or criticism if more crime data is released - but in the long run, well-contextualised transparency produces shared diagnoses and citizen co-responsibility. The key is to complement openness with pedagogy: explaining contexts, historical trends and comparisons, so that the population interprets the data correctly and reacts with cooperation rather than fear.

5. LEADERSHIP AS THE INTEGRATING AXIS OF THE THREE PILLARS

5.1. OODA CYCLE APPLIED TO THE THREE PILLARS

The OODA (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act) cycle, formulated by John Boyd in the military (Osinga, 2007; Boyd, 2018), has established itself as an adaptable framework for police and public safety management. Its value lies in its ability to structure rapid, flexible and evidence-based decision-making processes. Applied to the Security Forces and Corps, this scheme makes it possible to translate the observation of the environment into operational hypotheses, prioritise problems through contextual analysis, select proportional measures and implement interventions accompanied by public communication. The sequence is not linear, but cyclical: each phase generates products that feed back into the process, ensuring institutional learning and adaptability in the face of a changing adversary or the social dynamics of criminality.

It describes an iterative process of decision-making in uncertain and dynamic environments. Its contribution to citizen security is twofold: it accelerates institutional response and improves its quality by emphasising the orientation phase (understanding

the context, filtering noise and adjusting mental models) as critical. Whoever goes through the cycle faster and with better orientation displaces the adversary to a reactive tempo, even with fewer material resources.

In the same vein, Newport News Police was the first agency-wide pilot of problem-oriented policing (POP) that crystallised the SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment) cycle and demonstrated significant reductions in specific problems: -39% downtown burglaries, -35% flat burglaries, -53% car park thefts, by applying causal analysis and tailored responses instead of undifferentiated patrolling. Since then, systematic reviews show that POP is effective in reducing crime and disorder, especially when combined with situational and community interventions (Eck & Spelman, 1987).

Connection to the risk equation (R = A × V): The OODA cycle provides operational leverage on V (environmental orderliness, compliance habits, self-protection) and A (degradation of criminal capabilities, deterrence through presence and control). By iterating the cycle with good tempo, small sustained preventive decisions generate multiplicative reductions in risk.

Synthetic example. Seasonal theft spike in tourist area: Observe police data and local signals; Orient with seasonality, crime profile and vulnerability map (poor lighting, double-parked vehicles, influx of tourists); Decide on a combined package of actions (reinforcement of mobile patrols, administrative inspections of hotspots, multilingual advice campaign); Act by implementing these measures and measuring results (rapid perception surveys, incidence indicators). The cycle is repeated until the situation stabilises.

The expected operational outputs in each phase of the OODA cycle are outlined below:

Table 3

Application of the OODA Cycle to Citizen Security: Phases, Actions and Outputs

OODA Phase	Action on citizen security	Operational deliverable
Observe	Collect signals: complaints, calls, neighbourhood warnings, mobility data, "hot spots".	Initial situation report + baseline indicators
Orient	Analyse context (A×V matrix), seasonality, habits, applicable regulations, biases. Prioritise problems.	Hypothesis and A×V map with prioritised problems.
Decide	Choose measures: controls, inspections, environmental redesign, reinforcement of patrols, public messages (ROE).	Proportional and measurable operational plan
Act	Police deployments, administrative interventions, targeted strikes, information campaigns and public communication.	Results report, lessons learnt and next iteration

Source: Own elaboration as an adaptation of Boyd's Cycle theory to citizen security.

https://doi.org/10.64217/logosguardiacivil.v4i1.8569
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1026-6211

5.2. MISSION-ORIENTED LEADERSHIP

Within the three pillars of public safety - prevention, investigation and communication - leadership serves as the central integrating pillar. While they have been presented as distinct pillars, their effective articulation depends on a fourth underlying element: leadership. Adequate leadership acts as the backbone that aligns preventive, reactive and communicative efforts towards common goals, ensuring coherence and effectiveness in law enforcement action. In the context of police we speak specifically of mission-oriented leadership, a concept inspired by the military command philosophy known as mission command (Auftragstaktik). This style of leadership is characterised by a clear definition of the mission, the desired goals and the rules of engagement, while at the same time allowing ample room for initiative at the lower echelons. Thus, instead of monopolising all operational decisions, the senior leader assumes the role of "leader of leaders": he sets the mission and cedes part of the authority to his middle managers. Command-by-mission doctrine emphasises that the commander delegates execution without abdicating ultimate responsibility, maintaining control of intent and purpose while empowering lower echelons to decide the how (U.S. Army, 2019; UK Ministry of Defence, 2017). In other words, the commander establishes what is to be achieved (aim and purpose) and allows subordinates to decide how to do so within the margins of the command's intent (U.S. Army, 2019; UK Ministry of Defence, 2017). This approach creates more orderly units with greater autonomy, while retaining command accountability. Discipline and mutual trust are strengthened: middle officers feel the backing of the superior and officers have confidence in clear leadership. In this configuration, the entire chain of command collaborates not only in executing, but also in formulating strategy, and is invested in the success of the mission (U.S. Army, 2019; UK Ministry of Defence, 2017).

Keys to decentralised leadership:

Clear mission and delegation. The higher command clearly communicates the what and why of the mission, leaving middle commanders free to decide the how. By "saying what to achieve, not how to do it", agile and creative teams are built that are committed to the common goal (U.S. Army, 2019; UK Ministry of Defence, 2017).

Empowerment with accountability. Delegating operational authority does not dilute accountability: the well-empowered team solves most problems on the spot without escalation to the superior when the commander's intent is well understood (U.S. Army, 2019; UK Ministry of Defence, 2017). At the same time, the leader maintains strategic control and assumes the ultimate consequences of subordinate decisions.

Culture of trust and learning. The commander tolerates reasonable mistakes and integrates them into a cycle of continuous improvement, avoiding 'paralysis by analysis' and encouraging disciplined initiative within clear guidelines (U.S. Army, 2019; UK Ministry of Defence, 2017). A climate of trust creates 'disciplined freedom': scope for action with professional accountability, sufficient training and command support (U.S. Army, 2019; UK Ministry of Defence, 2017).

Continuous leader development. The senior commander invests in training and mentoring subordinates, reinforcing their skills through feedback and example. In

effective leadership, the leader acts as a catalyst for change, inspiring others and enabling new leaders to emerge (Goleman, 2004; Kotter, 2012).

Decentralised leadership of this type requires, however, a strong control mechanism of intent: the top management must verify that the execution by subordinate leaders remains aligned with the strategic objectives. To this end, coordination meetings, brief but frequent status reports , and fluid vertical and horizontal communication are established. This "informed discipline" ensures that delegating decisions does not result in organisational chaos, but in flexible but coherent action.

In short, leading leaders - granting autonomy with clear intent and encouraging their development - reinforces the effectiveness of the three-pillar model. The entire chain of command collaborates in executing and designing the strategy, and is involved in the success of the mission. Organisational literature further underlines that participative and adaptive leadership is key to articulating diverse pillars in contexts of change (Heifetz, 1994; Kotter, 2012). This collaborative chain of command favours more orderly and efficient organisations, with greater commitment and shared responsibility at all levels (Ratcliffe, 2008; Goldstein, 1979).

6. EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATION: APPLICATION OF THE MODEL IN THE TORREVIEJA COMPANY (2017-2019)

As advanced in the methodological approach section, some illustrative empirical data relating to the application of the model in the Torrevieja Company (2017-2019) are presented below.

The Torrevieja Company was, in the period analysed, one of the Guardia Civil units with the highest incidence of crime recorded at national level, although since 2010 it has shown a downward trend. The traditional response to the increase in crime had consisted of progressively increasing the number of personnel and, in times of greater influx of people and increased crime (summer), operational reinforcement by means of reserve units.

However, in 2017, in view of the staffing limitations and the absence of reinforcements that had traditionally been provided by the Company in different key periods, due to the existence of other more pressing needs, it was decided to adapt the security model that had been provided to a more participatory and communicative model, implementing a mission-oriented leadership model based on three pillars: crime prevention, investigation and communication, both externally (citizens and institutional actors) and internally (internal marketing).

https://doi.org/10.64217/logosguardiacivil.v4i1.8569
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1026-6211



Source: own elaboration (2019). This service potential does not include external support.

In terms of personnel management, the division of labour by areas of specialisation was facilitated, the sphere of command control was reduced through the delegation of tasks (personnel/support, research and operations) and mission-type orders were encouraged at all levels of command to streamline procedures and decision-making cycles through decentralised, low-level decisions under the principle of disciplined initiative.

The implementation of mission-oriented leadership in the unit analysed involved a re-engineering of human resources processes. It moved from a model of exhaustive control to one of delegation by specialisation (personnel/support, research and operations). This approach, aligned with the ADP 6-0 doctrine (U.S. Army, 2019), reduced the cognitive burden on the top command, freeing it for strategic planning, while empowering middle management and the rank and file. The "disciplined initiative" became the unit's engine, enabling faster responses (short OODA cycle) to the roving criminality that characterises the area.

The theory of the 3 pillars was widely disseminated internally in coordination meetings between commanders, magazines and on duty watches, and externally in security meetings, quarterly meetings with traders and farmers' guilds, media interviews, school principals, the judiciary, etc.

Sample of the transparencies presented in meetings with middle management, businessmen, local police, school principals, etc. between 2017 and 2019 in the Company of Torrevieja.

In terms of communication, apart from occasional interviews at command level, there was a programme on television (Comandancia[1] , on TVT) and another on the radio (A tu lado[2] , on Torrevieja Radio) in which talks were given periodically explaining crime trends and providing advice on how to avoid becoming victims of crimes in trend. Talks were also given through these media to raise awareness of harassment, gender violence, etc., as well as publishing the results of operations, investigations and, where appropriate, prosecutions.

Talks on the Master Plan for coexistence and improvement of security in schools, the Major Security Plan and the Safe Commerce Plan were increased.

[1] https://www.tvtweb.es/programas/1-nuestros-programas/100-comandancia

[2] https://torreviejaradio.com/microespacios/a-tu-lado

https://doi.org/10.64217/logosguardiacivil.v4i1.8569
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1026-6211

Source: Prepared by the authors.

With regard to the research pillar, an indicator of the increase in activity could be the number of congratulatory reports shown in the following graph:



Source: own elaboration based on an internal Company report of September 2019.

For its part, as a sign of the social reaction to such measures, numerous awards were received, with the Guardia Civil of Torrevieja receiving the "Salero" prize awarded by the local press of Torrevieja, the "Escudo de Oro" awarded by the Casino of Torrevieja, the Small and Medium Business Association prize, the prize for the fight against animal abuse, the "woman of the year 2019" prize awarded to a member of the Citizen Security Unit of Torrevieja and a special mention received by the Unit in Rafal, among other

distinctions. In addition, several statues were erected in tribute to the Guardia Civil and several public spaces were dedicated in various town halls.

The quantitative results, on the other hand, in terms of objective security were that, despite a notable decrease in operational capacity and the absence of support from other units, there was a significant drop in crime statistics.



Source: Prepared by the authors based on data from the Torrevieja Company.

Without attempting to establish a direct causal relationship, the temporal consistency between the implementation of these measures, the improvement in organisational climate indicators and the sustained reduction in recorded crime suggests that the three-pillar model, articulated through decentralised and mission-based leadership, is a useful operational framework for guiding police action in contexts of high demand and limited resources.

7. CHALLENGES AND PROPOSALS

A clear challenge is that of practical implementation. Conceptually recognising the three pillars is a first step; translating it into day-to-day management requires institutional adjustments. For example, police training should balance training in tactical and investigative aspects with communication and conceptual skills in subjective security management. It would be desirable to train in conflict mediation, public speaking, social network management, etc., from initial education, in line with the comprehensive approach outlined in this paper. Similarly, the performance indicators of citizen security units should be expanded to include prevention metrics (victimisation surveys, number of preventive activities carried out, reduction of risk factors in the environment) and communication metrics (degree of citizen satisfaction with the information provided, response time to neighbourhood requests, etc.), along with traditional crime and clear-up rates. This would encourage commanders not to neglect any area, resulting in security in both objective and subjective dimensions.

Another aspect to consider is the regulatory framework. Adapting regulations would make it easier to institutionalise communication and participation, preventing them from depending only on the goodwill of the commander in charge.

https://doi.org/10.64217/logosguardiacivil.v4i1.8569
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1026-6211

A model that emphasises communication and openness may face internal resistance. It will be the job of leadership (the "fourth element") to manage this cultural change, demonstrating that transparency does not jeopardise sensitive operations, but rather enhances them in most cases. Conflicts may also arise in the short term: for example, if more crime data is made transparent, this may initially provoke alarm or political criticism; however, in the longer term it will allow for shared diagnoses and greater co-responsibility. The key is to accompany transparency with pedagogy: explaining contexts, historical trends and comparisons, so that citizens interpret the data correctly and become involved in solutions rather than reacting with fear.

8. CONCLUSIONS

Citizen security, understood as a fundamental legal good for the development of a democratic society, must be sustained by a multidimensional approach. Throughout this article it has been argued that such an approach can be articulated around three basic pillars - prevention, investigation and communication - activated and coordinated through mission-oriented strategic leadership. This theoretical construct, supported by doctrinal and normative references, offers several key conclusions and recommendations:

- Proactive prevention is irreplaceable. In line with contemporary criminological theories, it is concluded that acting on the causes and opportunities of crime before it occurs not only reduces the incidence of crime, but also optimises the use of resources and minimises social harm. It is a priority to strengthen public policies that address prevention at multiple levels: situational (safer environments), social (education, community cohesion) and individual (reduction of personal vulnerabilities).
- Effective research ensures the rule of law response. A strong second investigative pillar ensures that those who break the law face consequences, maintaining the credibility and deterrent effect of the legal system. In a complex criminal environment, this means investing in specialised training, state-of-the-art technology and inter-agency cooperation (both national and international).
- Communication with citizens is a strategic, not ancillary, pillar. Informing, educating and dialoguing with the population on security issues is as important as patrolling the streets or solving cases. Active communication increases subjective security when appropriate, but also alerts citizens when necessary, making them participants in their own protection. This helps build legitimacy and activates citizen collaboration, leading to better objective results.
- Mission-oriented leadership is the catalyst for integration. Without clear, empathetic and flexible leadership, the three pillars can operate in a disjointed or even competitive manner. The security leader must evolve into a comprehensive risk and people manager, capable of inspiring subordinates and gaining the trust of the public. Mission-oriented leadership, together with the agile application of the OODA cycle, emerge as fundamental tools for implementing the proposed model.
- Towards a coherent policy and organisational approach. To operationalise this model, institutions need to reflect it in their structure and rules. Laws, regulations and operational doctrines should explicitly recognise the triple mission of preventing, investigating and communicating as equally fundamental functions of the security forces.
- Co-responsibility and a culture of citizen security. A cross-cutting finding of this analysis is that security cannot be conceived of as a product provided unilaterally by the state, but as a common good that is built with the participation of all. This entails a cultural

change both in institutions (from secrecy to collaboration, from reaction to anticipation) and in society (from passive complaint to responsible involvement).

On the other hand, the analysis of the data collected during the period 2017-2019 in Torrevieja shows a consistent temporal coherence between the implementation of the new leadership model and the reduction of crime. While a strict quasi-experimental design would require the control of exogenous variables such as tourist flows or macroeconomic indicators, the magnitude of the decrease in property crime, coinciding with the intensification of preventive campaigns and the operational reorganisation under the principle of "mission-oriented command", points to a plausible relationship between the applied model and the observed results. Moreover, external qualitative indicators, such as the awarding of various prizes and recognitions in the region by almost all municipalities, corroborate that the perception of security and institutional legitimacy improved in parallel with the objective indicators.

In short, the three pillars of citizen security, integrated by mission-oriented leadership, provide a comprehensive and balanced framework for addressing the challenges of security in the 21st century. By preventing crime, investigating it when it occurs, and communicating and involving citizens throughout the process, societies can aspire to greater levels of both objective and perceived peace of mind. This model recognises the complexity of today's world - where crime is globalised, information flows instantaneously and social demands for transparency are inescapable - and provides tools to adapt to this without sacrificing democratic values. The Guardia Civil and the rest of the Security Forces in Spain, with their rich tradition, but also with their openness to modernisation, are in a position to lead this evolution towards a more humane, efficient and legitimate security. The immediate challenge is to turn these guidelines into concrete, measurable and sustainable practices. The fruits of such an endeavour will not only be measured in crimes prevented or cleared up, but in more united and confident communities, where security is no longer perceived solely as the absence of threats, but as the positive presence of cooperation, justice and social peace.

https://doi.org/10.64217/logosguardiacivil.v4i1.8569
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1026-6211

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES

Beetham, D. (1991). *The legitimation of power*. Macmillan.

Boyd, J. R. (2018). *A discourse on winning and losing*. Air University Press.

Clarke, R. V. (1995). Situational crime prevention. In M. Tonry and D. Farrington (Eds.), *Building a safer society: Strategic approaches to crime prevention* (pp. 91-150). University of Chicago Press.

CDC. (2014). Crisis and emergency risk communication (CERC) manual (2014 ed., updated 2018). Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/25531

Cohen, L. E., & Felson, M. (1979). Social change and crime rate trends: A routine activity approach. *American Sociological Review, 44*(4), 588-608. https://doi.org/10.2307/2094589

Covello, V. T., & Sandman, P. M. (2001). Risk communication: Evolution and revolution. In A. Wolbarst (Ed.), *Solutions to an environment in peril* (pp. 164-178). Johns Hopkins University Press.

De la Morena y de la Morena, L. (1987). *Los conceptos de "orden público" y de "seguridad ciudadana" tras la Constitución de 1978*. Revista de Administración Local y Autonómica (REALA), 234, 289-314.

Eck, J. E., & Spelman, W. (1987). *Problem-solving: Problem-oriented policing in Newport News*. Police Executive Research Forum.

Espasa Cubero, E. (2015). Public policies on citizen security: Analysis and proposals from Criminology. *Spanish Journal of Criminological Research, 13*(3), 1-27.

Freixes Sanjuán, T., & Remotti Carbonell, J. C. (1995). La configuración constitucional de la seguridad ciudadana. *Revista de Estudios Políticos, 87*, 141-162. https://ddd.uab.cat/record/199499

Garland, D. (2005). *La cultura del control: Crimen y orden social en la sociedad contemporánea*. Gedisa. (Original work published in 2001).

Gledhill, J. (2013). The mismanagement of public safety. *Journal of Social Anthropology, 22*, 25-57. https://doi.org/10.5209/rev_RASO.2013.v22.43182

Goldstein, H. (1979). Improving policing: A problem-oriented approach. *Crime & Delinquency, 25*(2), 236-258.

Goleman, D. (2004). What makes a leader? *Harvard Business Review, 82*(1), 82-91.

González Sandoval, J. (2013). Citizen security and administration of justice. Revista de Derecho, (8), 81-88. https://doi.org/10.5377/derecho.v0i8.981

Granados Becerra, J. C. (2018). Citizen security in Bogotá. Analysis of budget and efficiency in local spending 2011-2016. Revista Digital de Derecho Administrativo, (20), 201-238. https://doi.org/10.18601/21452946.n20.09

Guillén Lasierra, F. (2015). *Models of policing and security* [Doctoral thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona]. TDX/DDD.

Guillén Lasierra, F. (2016). Police: Models, strategies and reforms. From governmental policing to plural security. *Police and Public Security, 6*(2), 205-234.

Heifetz, R. A. (1994). *Leadership without easy answers.* Harvard University Press.

Hobbes, T. (1651/2008). *Leviathan* (Part II, ch. 17). Modern version in Early Modern Texts.

International Organization for Standardization (ISO) (2018). *ISO 31000:2018 Risk management-Guidelines.*

Jewkes, Y. (2015). *Media and crime* (3rd ed.). SAGE.

Kahneman, D. (2011). *Thinking, fast and slow.* Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Kotter, J. P. (2012). *Leading change* (with a new preface). Harvard Business Review Press.

Ley Orgánica 2/1986, de 13 de marzo, de Fuerzas y Cuerpos de Seguridad. Official State Gazette, no. 63, 14 March 1986.

Organic Law 4/2015, of 30 March, on the protection of citizen security. Official State Gazette, no. 77, 31 March 2015.

Lindell, M. K., & Perry, R. W. (2012). The protective action decision model: Theoretical modifications and additional evidence. *Risk Analysis, 32*(4), 616-632. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.2011.01647.x

Mazerolle, L., Bennett, S., Davis, J., Sargeant, E., & Manning, M. (2013). Legitimacy in policing: A systematic review. Campbell Systematic Reviews, 9(1), i-147. https://doi.org/10.4073/csr.2013.1

Montalvo Abiol, J. C. (2010). The concept of public order in contemporary democracies. *Revista Jurídica de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 22,* 197-222.

United Nations, International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR/UNISDR). (2004). Living with Risk: Global Report on Disaster Reduction Initiatives. United Nations. https://www.eird.org/vivir-con-el-riesgo/capitulos/ch2-section1.pdf

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). (1990). *Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials* (8th UN Congress, Havana). https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-

mechanisms/instruments/basic-principles-use-force-and-firearms-law-enforcement

Osinga, F. P. B. (2007). *Science, strategy and war: The strategic theory of John Boyd*. Routledge.

Ratcliffe, J. H. (2008). *Intelligence-led policing*. Willan Publishing.

Recasens i Brunet, A. (2002). Security and prevention policies in Spain. *Revista Catalana de Seguretat Pública, 11*, 151-175.

Recasens i Brunet, A. (2007). *La seguridad y sus políticas: Hacia un modelo de seguridad integral*. Atelier.

Requena Hidalgo, J. (2016). Police legitimacy and citizen collaboration with the police. *InDret, 2*, 1-36.

Schneier, B. (2003). *Beyond fear: Thinking sensibly about security in an uncertain world*. Copernicus Books.

Shepperd, J. A., Waters, E., Weinstein, N. D., & Klein, W. M. P. (2015). *A Primer on Unrealistic Optimism*. Current directions in psychological science, 24(3), 232-237. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721414568341

Skogan, W. G. (2006). Asymmetry in the impact of encounters with the police. *Policing & Society, 16*(2), 99-126. https://doi.org/10.1080/10439460600662098

Slovic, P. (1987). Perception of risk. *Science, 236*(4799), 280-285. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.3563507

Sunstein, C. R. (2005). *Laws of fear: Beyond the precautionary principle*. Cambridge University Press.

Sunshine, J., & Tyler, T. R. (2003). The role of procedural justice and legitimacy in shaping public support for policing. *Law & Society Review, 37*(3), 513-548. https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-5893.3703002

Constitutional Court (1982, 7 June). Sentencia 33/1982. Official State Gazette.

Constitutional Court (1984, 5 December). Ruling 117/1984. Official State Gazette.

Constitutional Court (1984, 18 December). Ruling 123/1984. Official State Gazette.

Constitutional Court (1990, 28 March). Ruling 55/1990. Official State Gazette.

Constitutional Court (1993, 18 November). Ruling 341/1993. Official State Gazette.

Constitutional Court (1995, 8 May). Ruling 66/1995. Official State Gazette.

Constitutional Court (2020, 19 November). Ruling 172/2020. Official State Gazette.

European Court of Human Rights (1995). *Case McCann et al. v. United Kingdom* (Judgment of 27 September 1995).

European Court of Human Rights (2010, 12 January). Gillan and Quinton v. United Kingdom (Application No. 4158/05).

Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973). Availability: *A heuristic for judging frequency and probability*. Cognitive Psychology, 5(2), 207-232. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(73)90033-9

Tyler, T. R. (2006). *Why people obey the law* (2nd ed.). Princeton University Press.

UK Ministry of Defence (2017). Army doctrine publication (ADP): Land operations. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/677fe2d4d721a08c0066560c/Army_Doctrine_Publication_land_operations__withdrawn_25_May_2022_.pdf

United Nations Development Programme (1994). *Human development report 1994: New dimensions of human security*. Oxford University Press. https://hdr.undp.org/system/files/documents/hdr1994encompletenostats.pdf

U.S. Department of the Army. (2019). Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0: *Mission command: Command and control of Army forces.* U.S. Government Publishing Office.

Weber, M. (1919/1946). Politics as a vocation. In H. H. Gerth & C. W. Mills (Eds. and eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in sociology* (pp. 77-128). Oxford University Press.

Weinstein, N. D. (1980). Unrealistic optimism about future life events. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39*(5), 806-820. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.39.5.806

Wilson, J. Q., & Kelling, G. L. (1982). Broken windows: The police and neighborhood safety. *The Atlantic Monthly, 249*(3), 29-38. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465

Zedner, L. (2009). *Security*. Routledge.

https://doi.org/10.64217/logosguardiacivil.v4i1.8569
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1026-6211