La protección de las infraestructuras críticas submarinas y el fortalecimiento de la seguridad del mar Báltico: La operación Baltic Sentry de la OTAN
Palabras clave:
Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte, Mar Báltico, infraestructuras críticas submarinas, seguridad, Baltic SentryResumen
Los daños sobre los cables submarinos en el Mar Báltico han encendido las alarmas sobre una potencial guerra híbrida y la vulnerabilidad de las infraestructuras críticas submarinas occidentales ante posibles sabotajes, siendo así los reiterados incidentes sobre la zona señalada uno de los principales ejemplos de las tensiones geopolíticas existentes en la actualidad. El presente artículo tiene como principal objetivo analizar la Operación Baltic Sentry de la OTAN en un contexto en el que impera la creciente necesidad de la Alianza Atlántica de asegurar la protección de este tipo de infraestructuras críticas en el estratégico Mar Báltico y de reforzar así la seguridad sobre este último. Para ello, a través del empleo de métodos mixtos de investigación, el presente artículo primero explica la importancia de la protección de infraestructuras críticas submarinas en una zona de gran relevancia geoestratégica como es el mencionado Mar Báltico para después exponer el marco general de acción de la OTAN respecto a la protección de estas infraestructuras. Tras ello, el estudio expone las principales características de la Operación Baltic Sentry lanzada por la OTAN en enero de 2025 concluyendo que esta se ajusta a las necesidades requeridas para ser una buena estrategia capaz de permitir a la Alianza avanzar en la consecución de dos de sus principales objetivos prioritarios: la protección de unas infraestructuras cuya importancia es cada vez mayor como son las infraestructuras críticas submarinas y el consiguiente refuerzo de la seguridad en el Mar Báltico en pro de garantizar su resiliencia.
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